Members will hear testimony regarding security measures taken by federal, state and local organizing committee officials to ensure the safety of those who attended and participated in past Olympic Games. Senator Smith will preside. Immediately following the Subcommittee hearing (approximately 3:30 p.m.), Senator Smith will conduct a classified briefing in SR-418 to obtain information from federal officials, including the U.S. Ambassador to Greece Thomas Miller, involved with security preparations for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games to be held in Athens, Greece later this year. This briefing will be classified as SECRET, and all Committee members are invited to attend, as well as staff with a clearance of SECRET or higher. Following is a tentative witness list (not necessarily in order of appearance):
Witness Panel 1
The Honorable Mitt Romney
Chairman Smith, Senator Dorgan, Members of the Committee, Thank you for inviting me to talk with you today about the unique security and public safety experience we had in Salt Lake as we prepared for and hosted the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. It’s an practice for the management of each Olympics to pass on to succeeding Games their “lessons learned” – both successes and mistakes. Although security and safety planning and implementation varies greatly from country to country depending on the structure of law enforcement, there are operational lessons that we learned in Salt Lake from those who came before us and there are pragmatic lessons that we have endeavored to pass on to those who come after. I appreciate the opportunity to share some of those with you today. I am going to limit my comments today to a number of broad principles that were critical to our security planning and implementation. Mark Camillo, who led the federal public safety planning effort in his role as lead for the US Secret Service and can more appropriately address the operational aspects of the Salt Lake security and public safety plan. First, a quick review of primary lessons we incorporated into our planning in Salt Lake from the Games that came before us. There have been several extremely thorough reports written on the terrorist attack at the Munich Games, each of which helped inform our approach to Olympic security. The lack of basic security measures and cooperation between the Organizing Committee and law enforcement was stunning by today’s standards. This allowed the terrorists easy access to their targets at the Olympic Village and meant that, once the hostages were taken, there was no set crisis-management procedure to fall back on. In part due to the lack of planning for a security crisis, the person who negotiated with the terrorists, at their request, was the head of the organizing committee – my counterpart. For the first critical communications with the terrorists, an untrained chief executive negotiated for the lives of athletes. Today, it seems incomprehensible that this ever happened. Although there were many hard lessons learned from the tragedy of Munich, and the repercussions of that attack are felt to this day, there are two I want to focus on here. First, communication and coordination between law enforcement and the organizing committee are essential. Although it is often difficult to maintain a true public/private partnership – particularly between law enforcement and the private sector – when you are securing the Olympics Games, it is critical. The relationship must be seamless and the two must work as one team – practicing together, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and communicating constantly. In Salt Lake, the organizing committee worked hand-in-glove with federal, state and local public safety from day one. The teams that designed the venues, laid out locations of everything from tickets booths to parking lots to seats and trailers met regularly with law enforcement and took their input every step of the way. Our goal was to design security into our Games, instead of just putting a security overlay on the venues when they were done. Putting together a public safety plan that could anticipate and prevent attacks at ten different venues, the Village, Opening and Closing Ceremonies and our downtown Olympic Square was a painstakingly detailed effort. It required thinking through potential terrorist scenarios and devising workable procedures to prevent them in all types of weather and crowd conditions. Finally, these procedures had to be coordinated with all the other Games plans. After all, it’s easy to secure a venue if you simply shut down the roads – but then how do we get the people in, particularly when vehicles are the most commonly used terrorist weapon? Transportation and public safety have to work hand-in-glove – and many times there are no easy solutions. There are always concerns about securing the athletes in transit, and concerns about limiting vehicle access to any Olympic venue. Every road closure, every decision about which route buses would take, where the athletes would be dropped off and where the spectators would park and ride was made in close consultation with law enforcement. During the Games, a video feed from our transportation center of all the major roads and interstates fed directly into the Public Safety Command Center – and law enforcement sat side-by-side with the transportation operators to ensure that response and monitoring were smooth. We faced many barriers in achieving this level of integration and coordination between law enforcement and the private sector, primarily because we have too many unnecessary firewalls that prevent real coordination between government and private companies. We were fortunate in Salt Lake that all the senior participants from Secret Service, FBI, FEMA and DoD were willing to break new ground and take the risk of letting the organizing committee into the day-to-day planning. That effort paid off and the seamlessness of our coordination was one of our greatest successes in Salt Lake. The second lesson we took to heart from Munich was to take every precaution when securing locations where large numbers of athletes would gather – especially the Olympic Village. I won’t detail all the steps we took in securing the Village. However, our deterrents included double-fencing the perimeter, judicious use of cameras, motion detectors, screening people and goods through magnetometers twice before letting them in, and an inner, even more secure location that only the athletes could access. High-threat delegations, such as the Israelis, were given the most secure locations within the village and were allowed to bring their own security. Drills were run repeatedly on how to deal with an attack on the village – any scenario that can be dreamed up was planned for and rehearsed. Again, securing the Village was a joint project from day one between law enforcement and the organizing committee. One of the major lessons we learned from the Los Angeles Games was the need to do background checks on all employees and volunteers. This can be quite difficult unless the process is begun well in advance. Those who were in Los Angeles told us that, because many background checks weren’t completed before the Games began, convicted felons were holding critical posts – even security posts-- at Games time. I heard from the public safety leadership in LA that they had more problems during their Games with crimes committed by volunteers and employees who turned out to have records than they did from any other source. So, we started the screening process early and anyone who didn’t pass a background check couldn’t work or volunteer for our Games. That meant that we had to have over 40,000 background checks performed – and for those who would have Olympic Village access, the check was quite intensive. From Nagano, we learned a lesson that became even more valuable to us after 9/11. You may remember that the flu hit that region of Japan during the Nagano Games, and had a devastating impact on both the athletes and those attending the Games. Nagano was a relatively small geographic area, with tens of thousands of people from all over the world tightly gathered for several weeks – with bad weather on top of it. We learned how critical it is to put in place a public health operation that can immediately spot an outbreak and move to contain it. In a confined geographic area, sickness can spread like wildfire. Working with CDC, FEMA, Department of Energy, and DoD, Utah and the Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC) prepared a state-of-the-art public health monitoring and response plan and created the in-state capability to rapidly analyze biological and chemical samples. We received constant reports not only from Olympic areas, but non-Olympic locations as well. We also had environmental monitors that tested the air in key locations. Our biggest concern may have been a possible biological or chemical terrorist attack, but it was Nagano that brought home to us the importance of quick identification, reaction, containment and treatment in the crowded Olympic environment. But it was the lessons learned from Atlanta that had the most impact on security and public safety preparations for Salt Lake. Other witnesses here today will be able to talk in more detail about security and public safety planning in Atlanta. The after-action reports we received from Atlanta, and the lessons that were passed on to us by the public safety community, indicated that many of the problems in Atlanta reflected how slow we were as a nation to begin to recognize that terrorism was becoming a security issue inside the United States. When Atlanta began preparing for the 1996 Games, there had not been a successful foreign terrorist attack on US soil. Then, in 1993, the first World Trade Center bombing happened, and most of us heard of Osama Bin Laden for the first time. Not long thereafter, Timothy McVeigh stunned us all by his brutal attack on innocent people in Oklahoma City. Meanwhile, in Japan, terrorists used Sarin gas in the subways – showing how easy it was to wreak havoc and death in what had previously been regarded as a safe urban area. The reports we received indicated that with each new incident, the planners would develop ways to prevent and respond to these types of attacks. However, the planning effort faced an incredible obstacle due to the dozens and dozens of federal, state and local law enforcement and public safety entities involved in Games security and safety – with no clear command and control structure for Games planning. There was relatively clear understanding of who was in charge after an incident occurred – but there was no structure establishing who was in charge of planning for Games safety and preventing a terrorist incident from happening. And that was the crux of the problem. In the United States, we have a unique public safety structure. It evolved from our desire as a country to make sure that power is always retained at the most local level of government possible and that we never create the all-powerful law enforcement arms that viciously rule in other countries. But, in meeting this admirable goal, we sometimes sacrifice coordination – one of the key “lessons learned” from Munich. In Atlanta, where there were over 50 different public safety agencies – federal, state and local all “in charge” of securing a piece of the Games, the attempt to voluntarily pull everyone together to develop a coordinated plan apparently didn’t work. We were told afterwards that, about a year out from the Games, Vice President Gore came to Atlanta for a security briefing and asked a straight-forward question – “Who’s in charge”. The answer back was “it depends”. Not a good answer. Accurate, but when you are holding the largest peacetime event in history and terrorism has begun to rear its ugly head in your country, you want someone who can tell you that they are responsible for the overall effort. In Atlanta, no one was. So the primary lesson from Atlanta was that coordination among government agencies was just as critical, if not more critical, than coordination between government and the organizing committee. With one year to go, the federal government began to infuse massive resources into Atlanta – over 14,000 troops were sent in. Federal law enforcement agents came in by the hundreds. They hardened the Olympic Villages, increased security on the athlete transportation system, and put multiple layers of security on most of the sports venues and Opening and Closing Ceremonies. But, the Olympics is more than just sport – it is the gathering of world in celebration of peace and the human spirit at festivals, concerts, art shows and more. And one of the major celebration points, Centennial Olympic Park, became the target of a bomber. Another bitter lesson – sports and the athletes are not the only targets of terrorists – sometimes it can be the celebration itself that becomes the target. Both of these lessons would have enormous impact on our planning in Salt Lake. Following Atlanta, the White House decided to create a structure that would clarify who was in charge and make someone accountable for ensuring that a coordinated security and safety plan was put in place. President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 which set out a hierarchy for all so-called “National Special Security Events.” It put the U.S. Secret Service in charge of planning and operational security, the FBI in charge of intelligence and the immediate response to a terrorist incident, and FEMA in charge of handling the consequences of an event with mass casualties. Even more important to SLOC, in terms of getting work done on a day-to-day basis, this meant there were just three easily-accessible individualsin charge of making sure that everything came together in their areas of responsibility. On the state level, Utah also put in place a structure that would produce a coordinated and integrated public safety plan and – just as importantly, put someone in charge. The Utah Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC) was created by the state legislature in 1998 with the authority to plan and direct the Olympic security and public safety efforts of various state and local police agencies in a unified way. At Games time, all of the personnel would work as part of a unified Olympic command – under direction of the Olympic Public Safety Commander and not under the command of individual sheriffs and police chiefs. Both of these structures, the federal NSSE designation and the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command, were new and I will admit we faced difficulties over the years as these new reporting relationships were evolved and refined. However, by the beginning of 2001, both structures were working extremely well and most if not all of the problems had been resolved. These structures ensured that our final public safety plan truly was coordinated and integrated at every level – federal, state, local and the organizing committee. One of the greatest lessons that we pass on to future Games is this model for creating a coordinated effort – even in the unique structure of U.S. law enforcement and public safety. We took the second lesson of Atlanta – that all large gatherings could be the target of terrorist attacks – to heart as well. First, we decided in consultation with the Secret Service that rather than spreading our Olympic celebrations, concerts and medals presentations around the city, we would create one multi-block area which would hold all the events and create a single site to secure. Admittedly, Salt Lake Olympic Square was an enormous site – stretching over eight city blocks. But, it is easier to secure a single perimeter and have limited points of entry for magging and bagging the public than it is to duplicate this effort in multiple sites. And, it allowed us to truly concentrate our resources where they could be most effective. We revisited this lesson from Atlanta in the weeks after 9/11. In addition to events held by the Organizing Committee, there were many events being held by the State, Salt Lake City, and others – some expected to draw thousands of attendees. Each event was reviewed by the federal government and for those where there was some concern that the event could be an attractive target, the event was either cancelled or a more robust security plan was put in place. We recognized the reality that you can never harden every target – to do that you would literally have to shut down the state. However, we also decided that there was no reason for us to create additional targets by having more events than we could secure appropriately. Another lesson we learned in Salt Lake that we have passed on to future Games is the importance of having a very clear communications plan – both before and during the Games. Obviously, the media is going to ask questions about the security plan for a Games and, just as obviously, the people answering need to be aware that there answers may be read or heard by those looking to plan an attack. This was initially a problem for us in Salt Lake. We had dozens of local public safety officials involved in planning for the Games, and the media soon learned that they could go to these individuals and often get dramatic or sensational answers to their questions. It was one of my greatest frustrations. Particularly when it was televised on national TV which venues were the safest and what the vulnerabilities were of other venues. The public safety community was unable to reach agreement on how much should be made public and who should talk until just months before the Games. Honestly, the horrible events of September 11 probably did more to convince some of our officials that communications during a crisis should be handled by the leadership of the public safety organization than any of the theoretical conversations we had earlier. In my opinion, the most important lesson we learned in Salt Lake, and the one that I repeat whenever I get the opportunity, is the critical nature of intelligence in preventing an attack. Most Games focus on two security aspects – preventing an attack by hardening the venues and transportation system and ensuring that the resources are in place to respond to an attack. In Salt Lake, there was also tremendous emphasis put on gathering information from all levels and sources and sharing that information between federal, state and local officials. While I can’t speak in this setting to the different methods employed by the federal, state and local governments to gather intelligence, I can tell you that it was a highly coordinated and aggressive effort. Jurisdictional issues didn’t appear to come into play; instead, each level of government used its people in every way appropriate to gather information – then all levels of government shared in the data once it was analyzed. Why do I think this was so important? As I said earlier, it is impossible to harden every target – even the Olympic venues. Remember that many of our venues were literally mountains – mountains which could easily receive several feet of snowfall in a night and where the temperatures dropped below zero after dark and the winds could reach storm force. We couldn’t put fencing all over those mountains; cameras and other equipment aren’t reliable in that cold; and there aren’t enough people to stand perimeter duty over hundreds of square miles in the freezing cold twenty-four hours a day. So, the Secret Service designed an effective effort – using the latest technology and surveillance methods and some very hardy agents. But, in the end, our best offense was to know about a possible attack on a venue like that before it happened. Good intelligence, effectively shared and utilized, was critical. The final lesson learned from Salt Lake that I want to focus on is the importance of putting the security and safety team in place as far out as possible, and then exercise, exercise, exercise. In Salt Lake, we had our final team from the Secret Service, FBI, FEMA, DOD and SLOC in place over a year out. This team had to manage as one unit during the Games, and they spent over a year meeting and talking daily until working together became second nature. That broke down many of the usual barriers to a truly integrated operational effort. We also held exercise for all levels of personnel involved – from the local cop on the street to the senior management at SLOC. And we didn’t hold one or two exercises – we held dozens. And with each we learned. I remember clearly one of the first I participated in where, instead of letting the venue manager and the law enforcement lead at the venue make the decisions, I ordered the evacuation of the building because of smoke – theoretically sending hundreds of people into an area where a car had just exploded. Lesson learned – let the operational decisions be made by those on the ground. And with each exercise, we all learned – and we fixed the problems we found and then went looking for more. We tell all future Games to start exercising early and to make sure that they conduct their exercises in conjunction with the government agencies that they will be working with during the Games. It’s the only way to make sure that when the real thing starts, you’re ready. Mr. Chairman, all of these lessons have been passed on to Greece, Turin, and China. In some cases, the problems we addressed are uniquely American – in others, they are applicable to any country hosting an Olympics and trying to ensure that the Games are safe from terrorist attack. I would urge you as you look into security and safety planning for those Games, that you ask the following questions: n Is there an integrated and coordinated security plan that has been adopted by every entity – public and private – with a role to play in securing the Games? n Is there a clear chain of command for security and safety? n Is there an aggressive intelligence operation and will the information be shared with those on the ground that need to know it? n Have exercises been conducted with all participants? n Has the process for communications during an incident been agreed to? n Have security precautions been put in place for all large gatherings around the time of the Games – and not just the Olympic venues? n Is there a real-time public health monitoring and response plan? Has it been tested? n Have all security precautions been taken at the Olympic venues, in the transportation system, and at the Olympic Village, including background checks of everyone working in the Games? Clearly, the upcoming Games in Greece will have a different level of coordination and communications challenges from those we faced due to the assistance that is being provided by other countries to the security effort. Therefore, understanding the steps that have been taken to ensure that all security and safety related operations are well-integrated and closely coordinated is all the more important. I’d like to close with a personal comment. During the three years that I served as CEO of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee, I was asked many times whether or not it made sense to continue holding the Olympics, considering the increased security risks and the enormous expense of hosting the Games. My answer then, as now, is that it is more important than ever that the Games continue and that the United States play a major role in the continuation of the Olympic movement. For the athletes, the Olympic Games represent the culmination of years of effort and sacrifice. But for the rest of us, the Olympics are about far more than sport. Sport is merely the stage on which the athletes perform – and in them we see the qualities of the human spirit that inspire us all. The Games reaffirm that, no matter what country or culture, the human spirit can triumph and achieve through hard work, dedication, persistence, loyalty and commitment. In this time when the children of our nation and our world need real heroes, real role-models, the Olympics provides those heroes. In Salt Lake, hundreds of millions of dollars were spent by the federal, state and local governments and SLOC to secure the Games. Literally thousands of people – cops, soldiers, firemen, federal agents, public health workers, and volunteers – put in hundreds of thousands of hours in harsh weather and cold to keep the Games safe. Was that investment worth it? Absolutely. Because the Olympics also carries the dreams we have of a world at peace – the world we are trying to create for our grandchildren and those who come after. It is dream shared by all nations who send their finest to compete in the Olympics. And it is a dream we saw and felt on February 8, 2002 when, in spite of the threat of terrorism, every nation invited to our Games still sent their Olympic team and the athletes of the world marched together into opening ceremonies. Now, more than ever, the Olympic athletes are lights of inspiration and hope in our world – we cannot let terrorists put out that light. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Witness Panel 2
Mr. Steven Lopez
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is Steven Lopez and I am a 2000 Gold Medalist in Taekwondo and hope to replicate that accomplishment at the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens which will begin 100 days from tomorrow. Taekwondo is an ancient martial art sport, a variation of which dates back to 50 B.C. Over the centuries and millennia Taekwondo, which is similar to karate, has evolved into a modern-day sport that blends athleticism with mental discipline. While fundamentally an athletic endeavor whose purpose is self-defense, its practice emphasizes the necessity of developing mental discipline and emotional equanimity, and a sense of responsibility for one self and for others. Further, at its foundation is a strict moral and ethical code that stresses loyalty to God, country and family, and respect for all mankind. I have been engaged in the sport since I was five years old. At the current age of 25 that is eighty percent of my life. Although my God, my family, my friends and my education have always taken precedence, dedication to the requirements and principles of Taekwondo have guided me for most of my life and have required that I learn to sharpen my focus to matters which I can control, and leave to others what I cannot. I was invited here apparently to discuss security concerns in Athens and measures to ensure athlete safety. Frankly, these are matters that fall into the category of those that are beyond my knowledge and control, and about which I lack the experience and competency to address authoritatively. I am not concerned about security. My focus is and will continue to be on preparation for my competition, and to representing my countrymen in a manner that will reflect favorably upon them. Security is the last thing that I am worrying about. Instead, I am trusting the United States Olympic Committee, the organizers of the Athens Games, and perhaps U.S. Government authorities to address these matters. I read a newspaper article last week where a former Olympian speculated that there is a high probability that the U.S. team, or perhaps some of its members, will eventually withdraw from the 2004 Olympic Games out of concern for security. In all due respect, the high probability is that this individual doesn’t know the athletes who will make up the 2004 Olympic Team and has forgotten what motivates them. I and my fellow athletes have prepared much too long to forfeit the honor of participating in the greatest athletic competition in the world. The Olympic Games are not merely an athletic competition, but rather, a unique lifetime experience that we are fortunate to have the opportunity to be invited to participate in. Please don’t ask me whether I plan to go to Athens. Rather, ask me what can I do to bring honor and glory to the United States, and to my countrymen whose support and encouragement will enable me to represent them this Summer. Thank you for your time and for your attention.
Mr. David Maples
Chairman Smith, Members of the Committee I appreciate the invitation to appear before you to discuss security measures taken by organizing committees and public officials on behalf of those who attended or participated in past Olympic Games, and how lessons learned from these past events may serve to ensure better security for future Olympic Games. Given the enormity of the Games, including the extraordinary number of nations that participate, and its worldwide audience, the Olympic Games present a tempting target for a wide variety of disruptive activities, from simple demonstrations to violent acts of terrorism. Of course, the goal of the host country is to provide a secure environment for the staging of the Olympic Games. The success of this endeavor is critical to the presentation of the world’s largest and most widely viewed sporting event. There are factors, such as applicable laws, governmental structure, jurisdictional authority, available assets and culture, that govern or influence planning and ultimately the security measures taken by federal, state and local level officials of any host nation. Additionally, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is an international non-government, non-profit organization that owns all rights to the Olympic Games and dictates specific rules under which the Games are organized and presented. It is also the umbrella organization of the Olympic Movement which includes the National Olympic Committees, International Sports Federations, and various other organizations and institutions recognized by the IOC as well as the host city organizing committee. The makeup of past organizing committees has varied greatly, from including direct government representation to that of being solely private, as is done in the U.S. During the course of its planning, the organizing committee makes many decisions, such as venue selection, venue design, policies regarding admission to events or access to athlete housing and training sites, pre-event protection of property and assets, Olympic family housing, accreditation, and use of private security, that impact security planning measures. The host country government structure and its representation, or lack thereof, in the organizing committee affects the degree of authority and participation government security forces exercise inside properties and facilities owned, contracted to or used by the Olympic family. Government Olympic security efforts are focused on issues of public safety. In general terms, preparations are divided into topics of Intelligence, Investigation, Physical Security, Emergency Response to Incidents, and Mitigation of Incidents. Due to unique jurisdictional, legislative and budgetary issues as well as widely different capabilities, all agencies recognize that planning and operational execution requires an immense amount of interagency communication and cooperation. The tragic incident during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany certainly changed the world’s view of the standard of security necessary for the Games. The subsequent expectations of the IOC, athletes, delegations and spectators for extraordinary security at Olympic Games have been met by successively increased government commitment to security and expenditures. In recent years, as terrorist activity has increased, and the methods used to strike have become more sophisticated, efforts to protect the Games have become more complex and expensive. I would like to briefly illustrate this to you using examples of four recent summer Olympic Games. Los Angeles – 1984 When Tehran, the only other city bidding for the 1984 Olympic Games, withdrew, Los Angeles was awarded the Games by the IOC, but the issue of financing became an obstacle to the city signing a contract. In an unprecedented move by the IOC, the financial liability for the Games was removed from the City of Los Angeles and placed on a private organizing committee. The Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) was the first private committee, without official ties to government, to organize and operate the Olympic Games. As such, LAOOC’s philosophy was to be as economic as possible while still presenting a complete Olympics. The presentation of the Games was financed by the private sector, without government subsidies or taxpayer contributions, but the costs of protecting the Games greatly exceeded agencies normal operating budgets. This greatly impacted federal, state and local organizations that had a duty to provide for the public safety. Use of as many existing facilities as possible spread the core of the Games over seven southern California counties, with preliminary soccer events in Massachusetts and Maryland. By and large, LAOOC did not request specific security services from government and therefore was not obligated to pay for them. Only a small portion of local governments’ security costs were financially assumed by LAOOC. Before the Organizing Committee was actively involved in security planning for the Games, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and the FBI took the lead and coordinated security planning. The cornerstone of the planning, which continued through the Games, was the recognition of jurisdictional autonomy. Sixteen topics formed the basis for the security planning structure. They were Accreditation, Air Support, Bombs/Explosive Devices, Communications, Community Relations, Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice, Dignitary Protection, Emergency Response, Intelligence, International Entry, In Transit Security, Olympic Village Security, Traffic Control, Training, Transportation and Venue/Vital Point Security. The federal government supplemented local law enforcement agencies with approximately $50 million of logistical support equipment that they needed to provide adequate security for the Games, including communications equipment, helicopters, intrusion detection systems for the villages and miscellaneous medical equipment. The security department of LAOCC, which had no law enforcement authority, took the responsibility for protecting property and assets belonging to LAOOC, providing accreditation control at the villages, venues and training sites, providing security for IOC officials, and protecting special interest areas such as press and broadcast zones and accreditation, illegal substance control and computer centers. Recognizing that many more agencies had need for Olympic related intelligence than were involved in intelligence collection, the FBI hosted a center that received information from national, state and local agencies, and distributed pertinent information to agencies and organizations with protection responsibilities. In all, some 7000 law enforcement officers were committed to the Games, with substantial federal assets poised to respond to breaches of security, mass medical emergencies or threats that were beyond the capacity of local or state agencies. The Los Angeles Olympics established the public safety-organizing committee relationship that has in large measure carried through subsequent Olympic Games hosted in the United States. Seoul – 1988 The presentation of the XXIVth Olympiad was fully supported and directed by the Republic of Korea Government. The Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC) was formed in 1981. The organizational structure of security for the Olympic Games was divided into two parts. The SLOOC had a security department that was responsible for overall coordination between the SLOOC Games Operations Division and the government security. It had planning responsibility in areas of opening and closing ceremonies, 34 competition venues, 72 practice sites, the cultural events and the Olympic torch relay. The government security operation was headed by the Committee for Security Measures. This was the policy making body for security for the Games and was chaired by the Director of the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP) with members from 12 government agencies. Day to day planning and operations for security of the Games focused at the Security Coordination and Control Headquarters which was responsible for overall planning, coordination and control of security operations for the Olympic Games. It was headed by a deputy director in the NSP with assistant directors for NSP affairs, Korean National Police affairs and military affairs. There were nine security divisions to address major security topics. They were Planning, Counterterrorism, Technical Support, Intelligence, Venue Protection, Personnel and VIP Security, Athletes Village Protection, Traffic Coordination and Training. Physical security duties for the various sites and functions were assigned either to the Korean National Police or Korean military units. The Korean National Police committed over 47,000 officers to Olympic security and the military committed over 42,000 personnel. Before and during the Olympic Games, there were approximately 42,000 U. S. military personnel assigned in the Republic of Korea. The U.S. military Olympic security responsibilities related primarily to the protection of U.S. military personnel and property. It was proactive in training and exercise with the Korean military. The 1988 Games underscored the necessity for cooperation and mutual support in the international community of law enforcement, not only in training matters, but in the execution of the security itself. For example, air travel was, and will continue to be, a primary means of transport to an Olympic host country. In a time before the high level of screening that is in place today, not only did the host country have stringent security, but obtained the cooperation of other airports that formed the feeder system to Seoul to participate in the security envelope. Barcelona – 1992 The makeup of the Barcelona Organizing Committee (COOB’92) reflected the active participation of the Spanish Government in the planning and operation of the 1992 Games. COOB’92 was composed of representatives from Spain’s Olympic Committee, Barcelona City Council, Generalitat of Catalonia and the Spanish Government. The mayor of Barcelona was the president of COOB’92. COOB’92 formed a security department to identify and resolve organizing committee security issues during the planning phase to develop COOB’92’s portion of the Master Security Plan and to implement COOB’92 security responsibilities during the Games. Spain constituted the Higher Commission for Olympic Security in June, 1987 with the Secretary of State for Security as chairman and charged with the responsibility of directing, planning, preparing and implementing security operations. In 1988 a security model was adopted that integrated public and private resources under the authority of the Commission for Olympic Security and integrated the efforts of the National Police, the Guardia Civil, the Mossos d’Esquadra (Catalan Police), the Barcelona City Police, other local police forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The administrative instrument was the Olympic Security Master Plan which consisted of 86 security project areas from national issues, such as intelligence, frontier security and control of territorial waters to Games specific issues, such as Olympic village security, accreditation and information security. Security and emergency response capabilities to address specific risks, such as power supply, water supply, telecommunications, dangerous materials, transportation systems were assigned to the Catelonian government and Department of Public Safety. Due to the locations of the venues, training sites, athletes’ village and official hotels, the National Police had responsibility for about 80% of the Olympic facilities security. The Guardia Civil had jurisdiction at the airports, the port of Barcelona, four venues and essential public services such as water, fuel and electric supplies, broadcast stations, telephone relay points and transportation services. Mossos d’Esquadra protected two competition venues and took part in crime prevention activities. Barcelona City Police took charge of traffic and street public safety issues. The Army supported the Guardia Civil and COOB’92. The Air Force provided protection of the air space and the Navy provided security of water competition areas and territorial waters. One aspect of the Barcelona Games was the use of cruise ships in the port for housing of guests of the corporate sponsors. Extensive sea side as well as port side security measures were taken to protect the 15 large ships. Approximately 25,000 law enforcement personnel and numerous support personnel were committed to security of the Barcelona Games. Atlanta – 1996 The Olympic Games trended toward being larger and more complex each four years. The Atlanta organizing committee promoted their Games as being larger than Los Angeles and Barcelona combined. However, Atlanta had far fewer law enforcement assets than either Los Angeles or Barcelona. Because of the similarity of local government structures in the U.S. in 1993, Atlanta adopted the Los Angeles Olympic Security planning model, and the security planning topics were virtually the same. A concern from the beginning was the shortfall between the generally agreed number of security personnel needed for Games the size of Atlanta (approximately 30,000) and the number calculated to be available (approximately 8,000). Ultimately a combination of state, local, federal, military, private security and volunteers were used to staff the security functions. Other public safety services were part of security operations which included expansion of trauma capabilities at local hospitals, coordination with area hospitals, coordination with public health services and the American Red Cross. The security plan included the integration of law enforcement, medical, mass care, shelter, fire and emergency management into a consolidated response capability. This planning was a critical factor in the organized response to the pipe bomb that was detonated in Centennial Park, killing one person and injuring approximately 110. Many federal assets were temporarily located in Atlanta for the Games, including capabilities to respond to conventional explosives, chemical or biological threats and hostage situations. Closing: The Olympic Movement tries to contribute to a peaceful better world through sport and to generate mutual understanding through a spirit of friendship and fair play. As our world becomes more complex, the challenges faced by security forces that have the responsibility to preserve an environment that allows participants and spectators alike to gather at the Olympic Games in the spirit of the Games, continue to escalate. When Los Angeles hosted the 1932 Olympic Games security consisted of police motorcycle officers to direct traffic near the stadium and a horseback officer to patrol around the athletes’ housing. Athens estimates its Olympic Games security costs will be $800 million, plus the support of security forces from several other countries. Security forces must prepare to prevent or respond to threats unimagined to previous Games.
Mr. Carl Lewis
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-committee for this opportunity to speak on the important matter of Olympic Security. The timing and the subject matter of this hearing are critical, and I applaud you for recognizing its importance. I have had the privilege and honor to represent my country on five U.S. Olympic teams and to compete in four summer Olympics: Los Angeles (1984), Seoul (1988), Barcelona (1992) and Atlanta (1996). In each of these games, security has been an important consideration and unfortunately, it is even more so now in the world we live in today. As an Olympic athlete, I am by no means an expert on security matters. What I am is an athlete who knows how to prepare for competition. To be successful, when an athlete trains and prepares for competition, he or she needs to focus his or her complete and undivided attention on training and preparing for competition. An athlete cannot be distracted by any other factors or diversions. My message and plea to you today is simple: as members of the U.S. Government please do everything within your power to ensure that the greatest level of security is available for the Olympics in Athens. I also have a message to the athletes who are in the midst of their training for Athens: stay completely focused on your training and rest assured that you will be competing in an environment that has the highest level of security ever provided to an athletic competition. To help raise your comfort level as athletes, consider the following: - Well over $1.2 billion dollars will be spent for security at Athens -- which is nearly four times what was spent protecting the Sydney Games four years ago; - For the first time ever, the U.S. Government is able to provide its own protection for U.S. athletes; and - The U.S. Government has been in close contact and working collaboratively for years with the Greek and other Governments on a joint security program – this will be an international effort. In my experience of competing in four Summer Olympic Games, I have always been impressed with the level of security provided athletes by the host nation. I have never felt threatened or concerned with security, and that has allowed me to focus on competition. I am confident that despite the new security concerns about Athens, the extensive and well-coordinated security programs that will be in operation will provide all athletes a high level of confidence and will allow them to focus exclusively on what they came to do – compete on the fields of play and connect with new friends from around the world. I am aware of those who think that sending U.S. athletes to Athens is an unnecessary risk. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, as a member of the U.S. Olympic Team that was not able to compete in the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, I urge you to ensure, that absent some clear and present risk, we never take that course of action again. Our athletes have been training for much of their lives for this very special moment. Let’s not take that away from them. The beauty of sports, and in fact, the very foundation of the Olympic movement is that sport transcends all borders and political strife. Regardless of the conflicts of the world and the various difficulties in international relations, we have a powerful and beautiful common interest: the competition of sports. It is my hope that this Olympics will be the best ever and that with your continued support, athletes are able to do what they do best – compete, without any distractions. I appreciate the opportunity to be able to present my views and speak on this important matter.
Mr. Mark Camillo
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, I am Mark Camillo, currently serving as a Director in the Washington Operations Offices of Lockheed Martin Corporation, working in the area of Homeland Security, here in the National Capitol Region. Although my exposure to advanced technologies, systems and services since joining Lockheed Martin have added to the depth of my knowledge relative to public safety and security, one of my previous assignments while serving in the U.S. Secret Service will hopefully be of particular value to this hearing. From 1999 through 2002, I served as the Secret Service Winter Olympic Coordinator for the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics. This assignment entailed the designing, planning and implementing of the Federal operational security plan for the Games. Protecting Olympic games was not viewed as a new idea as the security plan was being contemplated for Salt Lake. Protocols and traditions passed on from previous Olympic security planners lent credence to studying after action reports from previous games and visiting/interacting with Olympic security officials who were either preparing or actually executing their plan. Hence, traveling to observe an actual Olympic event was extremely beneficial. Leadership Roles You might wonder what actual role the agency responsible for protecting the President and other key Government Officials had for the Salt Lake Games. The Secret Service had a significant role in the security operations of the Games, due a Presidential Decision Directive executed in 1998, which put the Secret Service in the lead Federal role for operational security at National Special Security Events (NSSE). When any event is designated a NSSE, the Service is joined by the FBI, who has the crisis response lead, and FEMA, who has the consequence lead. LESSON LEARNED: HAVE A TEAM SELECTED WITH COMPLEMENTARY SKILLS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE TO TACKLE AN EVENT OF THIS PORPORTION. Partnerships Although the Federal team mentioned in the NSSE “package” sounds complete, they become integrated components, after joining the state and local public safety planners, who have an equally vested interest in a safe and successful event. We learned in Utah that partnerships were also critical with the Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC), who had the ultimate responsibility for the Games, and other key planners such as the Military and others in the public and private sector. The glue that held all these partnerships together consisted mainly of trust and mutual respect. Although Federal and State efforts to create sanctioned gatherings were largely successful, SLOC never lost sight of the value of communication and went to great efforts to ensure that all those who represented the key entities had ample opportunities to communicate, whether it was at a weekly scheduled meeting or a daily conference phone call. What we found was that rumors or concerns could be quickly put to rest, allowing more time to move collectively forward. Many committees were formulated. Some were in a steering capacity, and some were in a working capacity. The most prominent one was the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. A State legislated entity that had representation from all the counties affected by the Games. Additionally, key Federal partners were participants, as well as a representative from SLOC. Again, another example of promoting partnerships with all key public safety stakeholders. LESSON LEARNED: FORMING PARTNERSHIPS AT ALL LEVELS AND PROVIDING THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMUNICATE REDUCED SUSPICION AND DISTRUST. Operational Security What might be viewed as a new approach to securing the 2002 Winter Olympics was the inclusion of a very pronounced prevention and preparedness theme to the security operations in and around the official venues. Core components including physical infrastructure, HAZMAT/Explosive Ordinance Detection and access control were weaved into the general design plan of the venues. SLOC understood and worked in unison with the security planners to place security elements where they provided most value. The security planners in turn, studied existing site plans developed by SLOC in the early stages to find ways to introduce security elements into the venues in the least obtrusive way. With all security components operational before the gates opened, the venues were transformed into “operationally clean security environments” that provided in essence a filter for preventing acts of terrorism or criminality within the site. LESSON LEARNED: HAVING A ROBUST PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY AT THE OFFICIAL VENUES DRAMATICALLY REDUCED THE CHANCES OF TERRORISM OR CRIMINALITY DISRUPTING THE EVENT. Human Resources With a very limited number of state law enforcement personnel available, and a projected requirement of approximately twice the size of the state law enforcement workforce for overall public safety, a decision was made to turn to federal agencies for assistance. We were faced with challenges such as different job classifications (Officer vs. Agent) and commissioned authority. Also, equally challenging was drawing from all over the United States, which potentially meant assigning a Deputy U.S. Marshal from Miami to a security post on the side of a mountain, or placing a U.S. Park Ranger from Wyoming at a checkpoint in an ice skating venue. The solution to this problem was identifying representatives from each agency who worked in advance with the Olympic planners to match skills and interests with Olympic security assignments. Consequently, Federal officers who had skills and abilities conducive to the alpine venues were assigned accordingly. Distance learning CDs were developed and forwarded to pre-selected officers to prepare them for their assignments. Cold weather gear was also procured and issued once Officers arrived for duty. This also added to boosting morale since most assignments lasted on average of three weeks. LESSON LEARNED: ONCE SECURITY POSTS ARE IDENTIFIED, MATCHING OFFICERS WHO HAVE THE REQUISITE SKILLS, EXPERIENCES AND PROVIDING EQUIPMENT GREATLY INCREASES JOB PERFORMANCE AND SATISFACTION. Theater of Operation What distinguished the Olympic activity across the nine Utah counties was whether an event was an official venue or possibly a related event of a cultural significance that would also draw a mass gathering of participants and/or spectators. When determining the status of a venue, SLOC maintained an official venue list. This consisted of the ten competition venues and approximately four other venues that were critical to the functioning of the Games. When determining the resources needed for the Olympic security plan, the funding required was matched to the official Olympic venues. Consequently, there were no surplus resources for discretionary usage. With valid concerns raised by those local authorities who’s “Olympic events” could be viewed as possible terrorist targets, last minute efforts were made to find resources that would provide an enhancement to their respective security plans. LESSON LEARNED: REVIEW ALL EVENTS EITHER IN PROXIMITY TO THE OFFICIAL VENUES OR IN THE REGION AND DETERMINE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IF EXISTING SECURITY RESOURCES CAN ADEQUATELY SECURE THE EVENT. PUBLIC OFFICIALS MUST WEIGH THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A LACK OF ADEQUATE SECURITY WHEN ENCOURAGING THE HOSTING OF AN OLYMPIC RELATED EVENT. Military Support The use of the Military seems at face value like an obvious solution when there is a large requirement for personnel or equipment. Requests made to the Defense Department would presumably be met with an enthusiastic response to assist in the Olympic Mission. This, however, was not the case. Reviews of U.S. Military personnel and equipment in previous U.S. hosted Olympics revealed support that in retrospect could not be justified. The Salt Lake Winter Olympics was armed with a supporting team of Military professionals primarily from both the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Utah National Guard (UNG). Legislation provided tight controls over what could be provided. In some cases, specialized support was provided in areas like air space security, but generally speaking, the greatest areas of support provided for operational security were in the areas of equipment assistance and explosives detection support. Both of which became critical to the enhancement efforts set in motion after the attacks of September 11th. While the Title 10 forces (JFCOM) had strict rules prohibiting their involvement in law enforcement functions, the Title 32 Forces (UNG) had more flexibility in the area of law enforcement support. The flow of military communication and support increased significantly when a Joint Task Force – Olympics was ultimately established. LESSON LEARNED: THE MILITARY CAN PROVIDE VALUABLE SUPPORT, BUT HAS RESTRICTIONS ON THE TYPES OF DUTIES THEY CAN PERFORM. HAVING A COMMAND LEVEL OFFICER WITH DECISION- MAKING AUTHORITY ON SITE IS IMPERATIVE IF THERE IS ANY EXPECTATION THAT MILITARY SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PLANNERS SHOULD JOINTLY REVIEW REQUESTS BEFORE ASSISTANCE IS AUTHORIZED. In closing, I hope my comments and the six noted lessons learned provided value to the hearing. I applaud the Committee’s efforts to bring to light past security practices that might be useful for future Olympic games. I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you