Full Committee hearing scheduled for Wednesday, September 8, at 10 a.m. in room 253 of the Russell Senate Office Building. Members will hear testimony examining the status of NASA’s space shuttle program and NASA's efforts to implement the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Senator McCain will preside.
The Honorable Sean O'Keefe
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear today to discuss the status of NASA’s Space Shuttle Return to Flight (RTF) effort. When the President visited NASA Headquarters on January 14, 2004, and announced the Vision for Space Exploration, he presented a bold and forward thinking vision that is affordable and achievable. He stated that the first order of business is to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight as soon as practicable, so that we can complete assembly of the International Space Station (ISS), focus Station research on supporting exploration goals, and fulfill the commitments to our International Partners. These are the first steps on the journey to fulfill the Vision for Space Exploration. As the loss of Columbia and her crew reminded us, working in space is inherently risky. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, ably led by Admiral Harold Gehman, recognized the risks associated with operating the Space Shuttle and made its recommendations consistent with an overriding safety objective. NASA recognizes these risks and is working to mitigate them, while moving forward to accomplish our missions. Today’s hearing provides an opportunity to focus on the two key elements in our progress to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight; (1) our cultural and organizational changes and (2) our technical solutions. The Gehman Report indicated that systemic cultural and organizational shortcomings contributed as much to the Columbia accident as any technical failure. NASA brought in outside experts to conduct an in-depth assessment and to identify areas where we can change our culture and organization to improve decision-making, risk management, and communications. Recommended changes have been progressively implemented, and we are pleased with the progress achieved through the efforts of the NASA Team. We understand that addressing these elements, along with fixing the technical issues that led to the Columbia accident are critical to improving our standards and performance. Our decision-making and risk management processes have been enhanced through the establishment of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) at Langley Research Center. The NESC’s purpose is to provide independent technical expertise for engineering, safety, and mission assurance to augment the capabilities inherent in NASA’s programs. In addition, NASA began restructuring its engineering functions with particular focus on providing independent oversight of the technical work performed by the programs and improving technical standards. We are working through options to implement an Independent Technical Authority (ITA) for approval of waivers to technical standards and requirements. The Board recommendations urged that we develop a plan for ITA – we are seeking to implement the plan before Return to Flight. Within the Space Shuttle Program Office, NASA expanded the responsibility and authority of the Space Shuttle Systems Engineering and Integration Office to improve internal communications and coordination of technical issue resolution. The Space Shuttle program has added the NESC to formal boards and the Mission Management Team to assure a broader, independent evaluation of critical decisions. These are just a few examples of the numerous changes that are ongoing throughout the Space Shuttle Program and the Agency to strengthen our culture, improve how we are organized, and enhance our ability to perform our mission while focusing on safety first. When we began developing our RTF plan, we understood the technical solutions to the challenges we faced would evolve over time. There were no predetermined answers coming out of the Board’s recommendations, little prior experience to guide us, and no easy fixes. We put our best engineers on the job and our best managers in key positions to ensure that the Shuttle would be as safe as reasonably possible when it flew again. We have pursued multiple paths for some of the solutions in order to maintain our forward momentum. We have rescheduled the launch window several times to reflect achievement of milestones rather than have the schedule drive our planning. We have not allowed the budget to dictate the answer to any of the safety issues we faced. We have gone beyond the scope of the Board’s recommendations to make changes and improvements to ensure out best efforts. All of this has cost more than the original estimate because at that time we could not identify the technical solutions needed. Shortly after the Board issued its report, we issued NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond, in September 2003. We announced that we would update the plan regularly to reflect on going development. On August 30, 2004, we issued the latest update, the sixth revision of the Plan. Throughout the past year these revisions report up-to-date status. This plan details the current tasks and cost estimates for RTF activities to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight. In addition to providing updates on NASA’s progress towards RTF, the implementation plan recognizes the importance of RTF as the first step toward the long-term goals of exploration outlined in the Vision for Space Exploration. The updated implementation plan shows that NASA continues to make progress in all efforts to make the Shuttle safer. The revised schedule for implementing the Board’s recommendations demonstrates that NASA has a deliberate approach for achieving all necessary milestones required to close each action item. We have pursued our RTF plans in a purposeful manner, our progress has been steady, and we are optimistic that the launch of Discovery will occur during the window of opportunity in March through April next year. However, our RTF plans continue to be based on accomplishing milestones and are not driven by meeting a specific launch window. Consistent with this approach, NASA will comply with all fifteen RTF recommendations from the Board prior to launch. The RTF Task Group, chaired by former astronauts Richard Covey and Thomas Stafford, is charged with assessing the implementation of these recommendations. The Task Group, as of July 22, 2004, has conditionally closed five RTF recommendations. Our current plan is to close the remaining ten RTF recommendations by the end of 2004. The five recommendations that have been conditionally closed are: Recommendation 3.3-1 – Develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan to determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) system components. This inspection plan should take advantage of advanced non-destructive inspection technology. To close this recommendation, NASA has cycled all Orbiter RCC Wing Leading Edge panels and nose cones through the vendor for inspection and confirmation of structural integrity. Recommendation 4.2-3 – Require that at least two employees attend all final closeouts and intertank area hand-spraying procedures. To close this recommendation, NASA’s procedures have been changed to require a minimum of two technicians be present for all final vehicle closeout operations, even with completion of critical closeout procedures during manufacturing and assembly. Recommendation 4.2-5 – Kennedy Space Center Quality Assurance and United Space Alliance must return to the straightforward, industry-standard definition of “Foreign Object Debris,” and eliminate any alternate or statistically deceptive definitions like “processing debris.” To close this recommendation, NASA has ceased using the term “processing debris” and has changed all work procedures to treat all debris at the same high level. Recommendation 6.3-2 – Modify the Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency [now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)] to make the imaging of each Shuttle flight while on orbit a standard requirement. To close this recommendation, NASA has agreements with NGA and other government agencies to receive support using appropriate national assets. Recommendation 10.3-1 – Develop an interim program of closeout photographs for all critical sub-systems that differ from engineering drawings. Digitize the closeout photograph system so that images are immediately available for on-orbit troubleshooting. NASA has revised the vehicle processing procedures to mandate that closeout photography be performed and has implemented enhancements to the Still Image Management System to allow more efficient distribution of closeout photographs to support on-orbit troubleshooting. NASA has embraced the Gehman report and is committed to complying with all the Board’s recommendations, as well as self-initiated “raise the bar” actions to improve safety that go above and beyond the content of the Board’s recommendations. In addition to the Board’s recommendations, the Space Shuttle program is working fifteen self-imposed actions and directives. Of these “raise the bar” initiatives, the RTF Task Group has elected to review Space Shuttle Program Action 3, Contingency Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS). The CSCS capability could, in an emergency, sustain a Shuttle crew on board the ISS for a limited time to enable a repair to the Orbiter or allow the crew to be returned to Earth via a rescue mission. The Space Shuttle and ISS programs have made progress in defining and planning for a CSCS capability. The two programs have completed analyses that indicate that, for our first two flights at a minimum, it is possible to launch a rescue mission during the time that the Shuttle crew can be safely sustained on the ISS. Other “raise the bar” initiatives include review of processes, hardware and activities or analyses that we believe will make the Shuttle safer. These include analysis and testing to determine critical debris sources, improvements to the flight readiness review process, removal and refurbishment of the Orbiter rudders speed brake actuators, radar coverage capabilities and requirements, and hardware processing and operations. We continue to make significant progress in understanding the debris environment and the material characteristics of the Orbiter and External Tank Thermal Protection System (TPS). As a result, we are able to better target critical areas for hardening prior to RTF. Even more critical to our ability to return safely to flight, we have made significant progress in reducing the foam debris that is shed from the External Tank during ascent. Work to develop viable repair techniques and materials for the Orbiter TPS is under way, and progress has been made on repairing acreage tiles and Reinforced Carbon-Carbon cracks. As our efforts to return the Space Shuttle to safe flight have matured and the required work has been identified, NASA has gained a better understanding of the costs associated with this challenging endeavor. Along with the tasks required for RTF, we have reinvigorated our safety and engineering practices. As a result, we have continued to identify safety-related issues that require additional work. Earlier cost estimates presented in previous revisions of the Implementation Plan could not have included all RTF elements now under consideration. Nor did they address additional requirements that might be derived from our continuing evaluation of the Board’s recommendations, or costs incurred by other Agency activities in support of RTF. The current cost estimate, submitted to the Committee on July 30, takes into account all currently known potential costs, except a budget reserve. This estimate will also change to address new challenges that may arise after the first two flights in 2005. NASA’s updated estimates for RTF activities are as follows: FY 2003 $42 million FY 2004 $465 million FY 2005 $643 million (includes $309 million remaining “under review”) NASA’s updated RTF estimates through FY 2005 are reflected in Enclosure 1. The updated FY 2003 estimate of $42 million reflects actual expenditures and the migration of planned work from FY 2003 into FY 2004. The updated FY 2004 estimate of $465 million reflects the continuing refinement of our RTF plan, better technical definition of the work to be accomplished, and better cost estimates for the work. Our estimates for the remaining years are based on our experience to date, which is still evolving. Through the early part of 2004, the pace of NASA’s RTF technical efforts accelerated rapidly. We moved from planning to execution very quickly, and began to close on some of the multiple paths we initiated in late 2003. But there is still a great deal of work ahead, and we are still refining our technical solutions and our cost estimates. As we do and the content is better defined and understood, the budget projections will likely change again. They will also change in 2005 as we launch the Space Shuttle and assess the information gained by actual flight experience. The Columbia experience has moved us to reassess the Space Shuttle program in total. As a result, we are introducing a higher level of engineering and technical rigor into all of our safety and engineering processes and practices. Many potential flight risks have been reevaluated and mitigated, resulting in what we believe is a safer Shuttle system overall. Across the board, flight hardware is now subjected to greater levels of test, teardown, inspection, repair, and recertification for flight, and all elements of the program are reassessing the adequacy of industrial processes, safety controls, integrated hazard analyses, and flight hardware test protocols. When we return to flight, we believe the Space Shuttle will be safer, but we will never eliminate the risk. We are confident in our ability to maintain a renewed level of safety standard throughout the life of the Space Shuttle program. We have the best and brightest in NASA and industry working diligently to overcome the challenges of returning the Shuttle safely to flight. Although there will most likely be additional challenges before Discovery takes flight, the NASA and contractor team are confident that the Space Shuttle program can safely accomplish its role in the Vision for Space Exploration to complete International Space Station assembly. As John Kennedy so eloquently said more than forty years ago, “We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard." We are committed to the safe return to flight—the first step toward the renewed NASA mission to explore the universe. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to any questions that you may have. Enclosure 1 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 TOTAL RTF 42 465 643 RTF Activities - approved/paperwork complete 31 319 117 RTF Activities - tentatively approved/paperwork outstanding 11 146 217 RTF Activities - In Review Process 0 0 309 RTF Activities - Control Board Directive 31 319 117 Orbiter RCC Inspections & Orbiter RCC-2 Shipsets Spares 2 38 0 On-orbit TPS Inspection & EVA Tile Repair 20 68 34 Orbiter TPS Hardening 28 1 Orbiter Certification / Verification 47 Orbiter Other (GFE/Contingency) 15 16 External Tank Items (Camera, Bipod Ramp, etc.) 6 1 SRB Items (Bolt Catcher, ETA Ring Invest., Camera, other) 1 8 Ground Camera Ascent Imagery Upgrade 8 40 3 Rudder Speed Brakes 5 11 Other (System Intgr. JBOSC Sys, Full Cost, Additional FTEs, etc.) 62 50 Return to Flight Task Group (Stafford-Covey Team) 0 3 1 RTF Activities - Been to Control Board/No Directive 11 146 217 Orbiter Workforce (Ground Ops) 5 5 External Tank Items (Camera, Bipod Ramp, etc.) 11 109 92 Ground Camera Ascent Imagery Upgrade 52 Orbiter Workforce (Ground Ops, USA, Boeing, Logistics Eng.) 32 KSC Ground Ops Workforce 32 36 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 RTF Activities - In Review Process 0 0 309 Orbiter RCC Inspections & Orbiter RCC-2 Shipsets Spares 7 On-orbit TPS Inspection & EVA Tile Repair 96 Orbiter TPS Hardening 33 Orbiter Certification / Verification 26 SRB Items (Bolt Catcher, Camera, other) 26 Ground Camera Ascent Imagery Upgrade 3 Increased SSME Testing 35 SSME CAIB Impacts 20 Other (System Intgr. JBOSC Sys, Full Cost, Additional FTEs, etc.) 62
Lieutenant General Thomas P. Stafford (Ret.)
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the status of the Return to Flight Task Group’s assessment activities. In July 2003, the NASA Administrator chartered the group, under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, to perform an independent assessment of the agency’s actions to implement the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) as they relate to the safety and operational readiness of STS-114. The Task Group consists of 26 members from industry, academia, and government. Some key members also serve on the NASA Advisory Council’s International Space Station Operations Readiness Task Force, which I chair. And two serve on the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. All of our members bring with them recognized knowledge and expertise in a variety of relevant fields. The Task Group is organized for fact-finding into three panels – Management, Technical, and Operations. I have with me here today the leaders of these three panels. (Detailed biographies are appended to this testimony as Enclosures.) No stranger to many of you, Dr. Dan Crippen, who leads our Management Panel, has a strong reputation for objective and insightful analysis. He is the former Director of the Congressional Budget Office, has served as Chief Counsel and Economic Policy Adviser to the U.S. Senate Majority Leader, and Domestic Policy Advisor and Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. Dr. Crippen is also a member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. Mr. Joseph Cuzzupoli, leader of our Technical Panel, brings to the Task Group more than 40 years of aerospace engineering and managerial experience. Presently Vice President and K-1 Program Manager for Kistler Aerospace Corporation, he was Vice President and Program Manager for the Space Shuttle Orbiter Project for Rockwell International during its design, development, and initial operations, and was an Assistant Program Manager on Apollo. He is a current member of the ISS Operational Readiness Task Force. Colonel James Adamson, the Task Group’s Operations Panel leader, has an extensive background in aerodynamics and operations as well as business management. He is a former astronaut with two Space Shuttle missions to his credit. He has served as President of Allied Signal Systems Technical Services, a government services company which later became Honeywell, and was one of the founders and the first Chief Operating Officer for United Space Alliance. He is currently CEO of his own consulting firm, Monarch Precision, and a member of the ISS Operational Readiness Task Force. These three gentlemen have been deeply involved in the Task Group’s activities and will be available to answer the details of your questions. Since August of 2003, the Task Group has conducted extensive fact-finding activities at all levels within the agency and its contractor team. Task Group members have visited NASA and contractor facilities, participated in teleconferences, reviewed documents, conducted interviews, received formal and informal briefings, and have observed tests, simulations, and program reviews. In all, to date, the Task Group has conducted approximately 100 formal fact-finding activities and has issued more than 90 formal requests for information to the Space Shuttle Program Office. Throughout the process the Task Group has, when appropriate, consulted with former members of the CAIB to ensure our members fully understand the intent of their recommendations. The Task Group has conducted four public meetings at which it reviewed NASA’s progress in meeting the intent of CAIB and the group has issued two interim reports. The next public meeting will take place in Houston next week and another interim report is planned for October. Based on these extensive activities, I can report to you today that the Task Group is encouraged by NASA’s progress, and as we said in our last report, we have observed that throughout the organization the people of NASA are engaged and dedicated to correcting the deficiencies that led to the Columbia accident. We believe that NASA has made significant progress in many areas. At the same time, we believe that the agency continues to face significant challenges and has considerable work ahead of it in some areas before it will be ready to return the Shuttle to flight. Over the last several months, the Task Group has formally assessed and conditionally closed 5 of the CAIB’s 15 return to flight recommendations. This means that based on its independent fact-finding and deliberations, the Task Group believes that, contingent on the agency meeting some specific additional conditions, NASA will have met the intent of these 5 CAIB recommendations. I would like to briefly address each of these recommendations. The Task Group believes that NASA has conditionally met the intent of CAIB Recommendation 3.3-1 in its development and implementation of a comprehensive inspection plan to determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) system components. And that the inspection plan takes advantage of advanced Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) technology. In satisfying CAIB Recommendation 3.3-1, NASA has: • Requested the manufacturer to rebaseline all RCC system components • Undertaken development of new NDI methods for RCC inspection: thermography, X-ray, and eddy current techniques • Begun incorporating new methods of NDI into existing field processes. Prior to fully closing this recommendation, the Task Group wants to see completion of requirements documentation and directives, and the results of some additional testing. We believe that the agency has conditionally met the intent of CAIB Recommendation 4.2-3 to require that at least two employees attend all final closeouts and intertank area hand spraying procedures. In fact this commitment has been expanded to include all flight hardware closeouts. In satisfying CAIB Recommendation 4.2-3, NASA has: • Amended all manufacturing processes and procedures to ensure that at least two employees are present at all manufacturing steps • Incorporated more stringent quality assurance requirements through additional employee training, certification, and procedures for inspections and imagery. Before fully closing this item, the Task Group is awaiting completion of requirements documentation and directives, and the results of a program-wide audit. The Task Group believes that NASA has conditionally met the intent of CAIB Recommendation 6.3-2 to modify the Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency -- now the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency -- to make the imaging of each Shuttle flight while on orbit a standard requirement. In satisfying the intent of CAIB Recommendation 6.3-2, NASA has: • Modified Memorandum of Agreement with the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency to request all available data that may assist NASA in the resolution of investigations • Implemented an Interagency Operating Agreement • Obtained necessary security clearances for appropriate positions • Developed plans to demonstrate new capabilities in simulations. Prior to fully closing this recommendation, the Task Group is awaiting the assessment of simulation results. We believe that NASA has conditionally met the intent of CAIB Recommendation 4.2-5 by returning to a straightforward, industry-standard definition of ‘Foreign Object Debris’ (FOD) and eliminating any alternate or statistically deceptive definitions like “processing debris” by the Kennedy Space Center Quality Assurance and United Space Alliance. In satisfying CAIB Recommendation 4.2-5, NASA has: • Adopted FOD definition derived by National Aerospace FOD Prevention, Inc. • Eliminated the term “processing debris” • Conducted benchmarking to determine industry and government best practices and analysis on FOD handling • Completed workforce training on new definition and procedures. Before fully closing this item, the Task Group is awaiting NASA’s completion of FOD process audits and interviews. And, the Task Group believes that the agency has conditionally met the intent of CAIB Recommendation 10.3-1 by developing an interim program of closeout photographs for all critical sub-systems that differ from engineering drawings and by digitizing the closeout photograph system so that images are immediately available for on-orbit troubleshooting. NASA’s actions to satisfy CAIB Recommendation 10.3-1 include: • Established a more precise definition of “closeout photography” and strengthen general closeout requirements • Mandated that all digitized closeout photography be entered into a common closeout database system • Implemented enhancements to the closeout database system • Implemented photography steps in work procedures • Upgraded digital photography equipment and developed user training and photography certification. Prior to closing this recommendation, the Task Group is awaiting the results of simulations to demonstrate that the database can be accessed in a timely manner by appropriate personnel, the completion of photographer training, and development of a database system familiarization course and computer-based training. I want to assure this committee that the Task Group will continue to monitor NASA’s implementation of these recommendations and that we expect the agency to advise the Task Group if there is any material change in the status of any recommendation. Looking ahead, at our public meeting next week the Task Group plans to consider NASA’s request for closure of a sixth recommendation, 7.5-3, which calls for NASA to reorganize the Space Shuttle Integration Office to make it capable of integrating all elements of the Space Shuttle Program, including the Orbiter. Our fact-finding activities indicate that NASA continues to make progress with the other recommendations as well and we anticipate several of them will be brought to us for formal assessment by the Task Group in the next month or two. In April 2004, the Space Shuttle Program Office Safety and Mission Assurance Manager described for the Task Group a framework for reducing the risk from thermal protection system debris. The primary hazard control in the framework is the elimination of critical debris shedding. Should the primary control not be completely satisfied, the capability to detect impacts during ascent and to detect impact damage on-orbit provides warning devices. The ability to make on-orbit repairs to tile and RCC, and -- as a last resort -- crew rescue, provides special mitigating procedures. The Task Group indicated in its last report that it is satisfied with this “top-down” approach as it is applied to this hazard reduction program. We have said that we believe that this same “top-down” approach needs to be implemented across NASA as a whole and specifically to all NASA Implementation Plan items. Now, looking at some of the challenges, the Task Group believes – as stated in its last report – that NASA’s most important work is its efforts to eliminate critical ascent debris and the agency has made considerable progress in this area. If it could be guaranteed that no critical debris would come from the External Tank, the immediate cause of the loss of Columbia would be rectified. Analytical and testing techniques will allow a level of comfort before launch. Advances in NDI techniques may add confidence. Still, to guarantee that no critical debris will be shed is impossible short of extensive testing in flight. However, it may not be possible to obtain statistically significant data verifying External Tank debris conditions even by the end of the Shuttle Program. Therefore, on-orbit inspection and repair capabilities remain necessary to reduce the risk to future flights. Since our last report, it has become apparent that NASA continues to face some technical challenges in fully developing these capabilities. Should one or both of these capabilities not be sufficiently developed by the anticipated date of return to flight, the ability for the crew to await a rescue mission at the ISS will become an important consideration for the next launch. Therefore, the Task Group is assessing this “safe haven” capability. A universal concern of the Task Group is the personnel requirements to meet the CAIB recommendations and return to flight. The various new organizations, from the NASA Engineering and Safety Center to the Independent Technical Authority to the Space Shuttle System Engineering and Integration Office, all require talented staff drawn largely from the current NASA and contractor pool. In summary, the Task Group believes that although significant work lies ahead, NASA has made substantial progress toward meeting the intent of the CAIB’s return to flight recommendations. On Aug. 26, 2003, following the release of the CAIB report, we stated publicly that, “the Return to Flight Task Group is committed to doing its part to help ensure the Shuttle returns safely to space by making a careful, thorough, and independent assessment of NASA’s return to flight plans.” I want to assure this committee that the Task Group remains engaged and aggressive in its fact-finding and we will continue to carefully and thoroughly assess -- and publicly report on -- NASA’s progress toward meeting the intent of the CAIB. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the work of the Return to Flight Task Group with you. Colonel Adamson, Mr. Cuzzupoli, Dr. Crippen, and I now look forward to responding to your questions. Dan L. Crippen, Ph.D. Former Director of the Congressional Budget Office Dr. Dan Crippen has a strong reputation for objective and insightful analysis. He served, until January 2003, as the fifth Director of the Congressional Budget Office. His public service positions also include Chief Counsel and Economic Policy Adviser to the Senate Majority Leader (1981-1985); Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy (1987-1988); and Domestic Policy Advisor and Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy (1988-1989), where he advised the President on all issues relating to domestic policy, including the preparation and presentation of the federal budget. He has provided service to several national commissions, including membership on the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement. He presently serves on the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. Crippen has substantial experience in the private sector as well. Before joining the Congressional Budget Office, he was a principal with Washington Counsel, a law and consulting firm. He has also served as Executive Director of the Merrill Lynch International Advisory Council and as a founding partner and Senior Vice President of The Duberstein Group. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of South Dakota in 1974, a Master of Arts from Ohio State University in 1976, and Doctor of Philosophy degree in Public Finance from Ohio State in 1981. Enclosure Mr. Joseph W. Cuzzupoli Vice President and K-1 Program Manager, Kistler Aerospace Corporation Joseph Cuzzupoli brings to the Task Group more than 40 years of aerospace engineering and managerial experience. He began his career with General Dynamics as Launch Director (1959-1962), and then became Manager of Manufacturing/Engineering and Director of Test Operations for Rockwell International (1962-1966). Cuzzupoli directed all functions in the building and testing of Apollo 6, Apollo 8, Apollo 9 and Apollo 12 flights as Rockwell's Assistant Program Manager for the Apollo Program; he later was Vice President of Operations. In 1978, he became the Vice President and Program Manager for the Space Shuttle Orbiter Project and was responsible for 5000 employees in the development of the Shuttle. He left Rockwell in 1980 and consulted on various aerospace projects for NASA centers until 1991 when he joined American Pacific Corporation as Senior Vice President. In his current position at Kistler Aerospace (Vice President and Program Manager, 1996 ? present) he has primary responsibility for design and production of the K-1 reusable launch vehicle. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Maine Maritime Academy, a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Connecticut and a Certificate of Management/Business Administration from the University of Southern California. He was a member of the NASA Advisory Council's Task Force on Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and is a current member of the NASA Advisory Council's Task Force on International Space Station Operational Readiness. Enclosure Col. James C. Adamson, U.S. Army (Ret.) CEO, Monarch Precision, LLC, Consulting firm Colonel Adamson, a former astronaut, has an extensive background in aerodynamics as well as business management. He received his Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and his Master's degree in Aerospace Engineering from Princeton University. He returned to West Point as an Assistant Professor of Aerodynamics until selected to attend the Navy Test Pilot School at Patuxent River, Md. in 1979. In 1981 he became Aerodynamics Officer for the Space Shuttle Operational Flight Test Program at the Johnson Space Center's Mission Control Center. Colonel Adamson became an astronaut in 1984 and flew two missions, one aboard Columbia (STS-28) and the second aboard Atlantis (STS-43). After retiring from NASA in 1992, he created his own consulting firm, Monarch Precision, and was then recruited by Lockheed as President/CEO of Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company. In 1995 he helped create United Space Alliance and became their first Chief Operating Officer, where he remained until 1999. In late 1999, Colonel Adamson was again recruited to serve as President/CEO of Allied Signal Technical Services Corporation, which later became Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. Retiring from Honeywell in 2001, Colonel Adamson resumed part-time consulting with his own company, Monarch Precision, LLC. In addition to corporate board positions, he has served as a member of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and is currently a member of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on International Space Station Operational Readiness. Enclosure Lt. General Thomas Stafford, U.S. Air Force (Ret.) President, Stafford, Burke & Hecker Inc., technical consulting General Stafford, an honors graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, joined the space program in 1962 and flew four missions during the Gemini and Apollo programs. He piloted Gemini 6 and Gemini 9, and traveled to the moon as Commander of Apollo 10. He was assigned as head of the astronaut group in June 1969, responsible for the selection of flight crews for projects Apollo and Skylab. In 1971, Stafford was assigned as Deputy Director of Flight Crew Operations at the NASA Manned Spaceflight Center. His last mission, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975, achieved the first rendezvous between American and Soviet spacecrafts. He left NASA in 1975 to head the Air Force Test Flight Center at Edwards Air Force Base and in 1978 assumed duties as Deputy Chief of Staff, Research Development and Acquisition, USAF Headquarters in Washington. He retired from government service in 1979 and became an aerospace consultant. Stafford has served as Defense Advisor to former President Ronald Reagan; and headed The Synthesis Group, which was tasked with plotting the U. S. return to the moon and eventual journey to Mars. Throughout his careers in the Air Force and NASA space program, he has received many awards and medals including the Congressional Space Medal of Honor in 1993. He served on the National Research Council's Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, the Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological Program Reviews, and the Space Policy Advisory Council. He was Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions. He is currently the Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on International Space Station Operational Readiness. Enclosure