Cheering on the Collegiate Model: Creating, Disseminating, and Imbedding the NCAA’s Redefinition of Amateurism

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Abstract
In January 2012, during his “State of the Association” address, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) President Mark Emmert urged members to fix the “collegiate model.” Imbedded in the speech’s framework, this relatively new term in the NCAA national office’s lexicon has received spontaneous consent from the association, member universities, and other college-sport constituents including administrators, coaches, athletes, reporters and journalists, and college-sport fans. This anchor—“The Collegiate Model of Athletics”—has been adopted without disclosure regarding its genesis, dissemination, and insertion into college-sport’s institutional consciousness. This process of achieving spontaneous consent among constituents provides a case study illustrating the NCAA’s position as a hegemon, the institutional logics that sustain such hegemony, and the effective use of propaganda to quell critical examination of and dissent to the created collegiate model of athletics. Such examination reveals this process has not only been detrimental to higher education and the general public, but particularly harmful to college athletes.

Keywords
NCAA, collegiate model, hegemon, propaganda, institutional logics

In January 2012, during his “State of the Association” address, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) President Mark Emmert urged members to fix the organization’s “collegiate model.” Acknowledging college sport was at a “crossroads,” he

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questioned whether the college-sport community was going to adopt a “professional model,” as some suggested, or continue to protect the collegiate model. To that end, he said,

So here we are at this curious fork in the road, and we have to decide. Are we going to take the collegiate model, maximize our values, make the changes we need to make, but bring the collegiate model up to the 21st century consistent with our values as academic enterprises. Or are we going to wave the white flag, throw in the towel and say it’s too much. (Emmert, 2012, p. 13)

According to Emmert, reform efforts initiated in August of 2011 exemplified:

. . . two very simple, complicated, but simple propositions. One, that student-athletes have to be students in all the ways that we mean that, and two, we have to behave with integrity, consistent with our own values and our own rules structure. (p. 10)

He went on to proclaim:

Coaches, administrators, anyone around an athletic program have to be held to the same kind of behavioral standards as everyone else inside the university. Student-athletes have an obligation to take responsibility for a very simple thing, and that is you have to take advantage of the opportunities that have been put in front of you. (Emmert, 2012, p. 12)

Emmert’s “fork in the road” is not the only curiosity within his speech. Embedded in his speech’s framework is a relatively new term in the NCAA national office lexicon that has received spontaneous consent from the NCAA association, member universities, and other college-sport constituents including administrators, coaches, athletes, reporters and journalists, and college-sport fans (Brand, 2004; NCAA Executive Committee, 2004). The key expression anchoring Dr. Emmert’s remarks—“The Collegiate Model of Athletics”—was used without disclosure of its genesis, dissemination, and insertion into the college-sport consciousness. Given this moment’s “fork-in-the-road” importance, this process provides a case study illustrating the NCAA’s position as a hegemon, the institutional logics that sustain college-sport hegemony, and the effective use of propaganda in an attempt to quell critical examination or dissent. However, such examination reveals this process has not only been detrimental to higher education and the general public, but particularly harmful to college athletes.

Research Setting: Big-time College Sport in the 21st Century

By 2003, when Dr. Myles Brand1 assumed the NCAA presidency, big-time college sport was in the midst of an economic transformation. As reported in The New York Times, by January 2004 “. . . at least 23 college football coaches now earn $1million… That million-dollar benchmark, which was first reached by Florida State’s Bobby
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Bowden in the mid-1990’s sometimes does not even include the abundance of performance incentives” (Drape, 2004, para. 5). Many perceived spiraling coaching contracts, increasing bowl payouts and expanding television contracts indicative of a college-sport system run amok. William Friday, then chair of the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (KCIA), presciently declared:

We’ve created a huge entertainment industry driven by the greed factor . . . When you add it all up, what’s at stake is the integrity of the American university. You can’t be an example of integrity and leadership when you have television networks and shoe companies subsidizing these coaches. (Drape, 2004, para. 9-10)

Pete Carroll, at the time head football coach at the University of Southern California, ruminated on the incongruity of the big-time college-sport enterprise within a university setting:

. . . in another sense, in a more pure sense, it is kind of unusual that this would happen in a university setting, that there would be something that would be that far out of line. I think that’s clear and it is somewhat uncomfortable at times for me to think about that because we are just coaching football. (Drape, 2004, para. 13)

According to New York Times reporter, Joe Drape, Carroll conceded, “he often thought about the disparity between his salary and the pay given to the university’s professors” (Drape, 2004, para. 11). However, he also justified his $1.5 million salary as indicative of market forces. “It’s all about supply and demand . . . I don’t think it’s hard to justify that, when you take a look at the stadiums and the money that is generated by the programs and all that” (Drape, 2004, para. 12).

This conflict between the stated educational mission of institutions of higher learning and college sport’s adherence to free-market principles was not lost on NCAA leaders who recognized “an inherent tension between the intellectual independence of the academy and the use of corporate dollars to support any aspect of higher education” (National Collegiate Athletic Association [NCAA], 2010b, para. 2). Brand himself acknowledged increased commercialism did not square with the public’s expanded perception of amateurism “as a concept that defines the entire enterprise of intercollegiate athletics” (NCAA, 2010a, para. 3). The NCAA national office was well aware, “As the scale of both revenue generation and spending has grown over the past few decades, there is a general sense that ‘big-time’ athletics is in conflict with the principle of amateurism” (NCAA, 2010a, para. 3). To the NCAA staff and Brand it was clear this apparent conflict must be addressed: “Critical for the future of intercollegiate athletics will likely be a better understood definition of amateurism that isolates the principle to the way in which student-athletes are viewed without imposing its avocational nature on revenue-producing opportunities” (NCAA, 2010a, para. 3). Fundamentally, Brand “wanted to change the way people talked about intercollegiate athletics” (NCAA, 2010c, para. 1).

To bridge this gap, Brand and the NCAA national office noted as historical fact “the presence of commercial activity within the context of intercollegiate athletics is
as old as the games themselves and it is growing” (Renfro, 2012, p. 33). However, Brand declared unilaterally “participation in college sports enhances the educational experience of student-athletes and that such educational value is the only rational reason for the continued support of intercollegiate athletics in higher education” (Renfro, 2012, p. 33). Proceeding from this axiom, it was imperative Brand “as the voice and face of intercollegiate athletics . . . must continually reinforce the concept and steadily build the context for the relationship of intercollegiate athletics to higher education” (NCAA, 2010c, para. 1). To achieve college-sport hegemony, Brand and the national office crafted The Collegiate Model of Athletics—as “a term of art . . . created by Myles Brand as a surrogate for—but not a replacement for—the concept of amateurism to the degree it was too frequently used as a descriptor for intercollegiate athletics” (NCAA, 2010c, para. 1).

**Theoretical Concepts**

**Hegemony and Institutional Logics**

The most often quoted characterization of hegemony—attributed to Gramsci (1971)—involves

... the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is “historically” caused by the prestige (and subsequent confidence) that the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function. (p. 12)

This dominant group, which Strange (1987) refers to as the hegemon, can be either “strong” or “weak,” with a strong hegemon producing a semblance of order and stability. While, as Strange (1987) noted, “... hegemonic power is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for order” (p. 555), hegemonic order and stability can be subtly achieved through what Gramsci (1971) described as spontaneous consent. Such consent may be achieved through real or perceived force, but may also be exercised through the use of example setting, persuasion, and coercion (Snidal, 1985). Gramsci (1971) and Adamson (1980) noted hegemony is also rooted in—and dependent on—the hegemon’s “folklore.” This folklore’s context is created, reinforced and maintained through the hegemon’s control of language and common sense, and built on an entire system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, and ways of seeing and acting.

When hegemony is exerted only through example and persuasion, and deemed beneficial to dominant and subordinate groups, it is characterized as “beneficent” (Snidal, 1985). While hegemony may have beneficent roots, Gramsci (1971) noted hegemony is often maintained through subtle or overt coercion, and results in the exploitation of subordinates or nonruling groups.

Fundamentally, hegemony has little meaning without reference to notions of domination. To achieve dominance a hegemon may utilize physical, political, economic, or moral force (Adamson, 1980; Gramsci, 1971). Regardless, a hegemon often prefers to
be seen as beneficent, relying on moral authority exerted through the creation and perpetuation of legitimating symbols and the adoption of institutional logics by dominant and subservient group members (Southall, Nagel, Amis, & Southall, 2008). However, the threat of officially sanctioned force always remains implicit (Gramsci, 1971). Fundamentally, a ruling group seeks to achieve and maintain hegemony by manufacturing and/or gaining subordinate groups’ explicit or implicit consent.

Both hegemony and institutional logics theory describe the importance of the consent of subordinate groups and individuals to the dominant-group’s agreed-upon values, norms, perceptions, beliefs, sentiments, and prejudices (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Southall et al., 2008). Over time, these values, norms or beliefs become taken for granted “facts,” reflected in specific unquestioned courses of action (Southall et al., 2008). The dominant group defines, controls, and supports the distribution of these logics and the established order.

However, such consent is not always one-dimensional. Sometimes conflict arises between individuals’ or groups’ conscious thoughts and the values or norms espoused by a hegemonic institution. Within an institutional field a subordinate group may develop its own institutional conception, or borrow a conflicting logic from another group (Gramsci, 1971; Purdy & Gray, 2009). Purdy and Gray (2009) identify this agency-based activity as the work of institutional entrepreneurs who enact and cultivate opportunities for change. This contradictory logic or consciousness may influence moral conduct and implicitly unite a subordinate social group, but may not be powerful enough to permit any action. Instead, it may produce a condition of “moral and political passivity” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 333).

When viewed from this theoretical perspective, hegemonic maintenance of a dominant institutional logic does not require subordinate groups’ active commitment and consent. The hegemon’s logic maintains legitimacy because subordinate groups and individuals find it difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize an oppositional logic. The inability to conceptualize an oppositional logic results from the hegemon’s control of language and common sense (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1992). This linguistic control marks the boundaries of any discourse, making it difficult or sometimes impossible for those exploited or dispossessed to determine the source of their alienation, let alone conceptualize remedies (Gramsci, 1971; Purdy & Gray, 2009).

This contradictory consciousness results in subordinates adopting a mental and emotional state that fluctuates between resistance and conformity, disagreement, and apathy (Gramsci, 1971). The dominant group never completely achieves consent, but most often exploited and/or subordinate groups are divided and ambiguous in their consciousness, unable to break away from the accepted “folklore” (Gramsci, 1971). As a result, institutional hegemony is protected by the dominant group’s “created” linguistic and philosophical “armor of coercion” (Adamson, 1980, p. 215). This folkloric armor is fashioned by language (expressions of determined concepts and agreed-upon values), common sense (conventional wisdom), and accepted systems of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, and norms (logics; Adamson, 1980; Southall et al., 2008).
Sociological Propaganda

For some observers, Adamson’s amour of coercion is clearly *propaganda*. For others, such developed folklore is simply promoting enduring values. One often-noted element distinguishing propaganda from such promotion is Qualter’s (1962) distinction that propaganda involves the use of “instruments of communication” as part of a “deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control, or alter the attitudes of other groups” (p. 27). Ellul (1965) described propaganda in much the same way as Gramsci defined hegemony. Jowett and O’Donnell (1992) identify propaganda as predetermined fabrication and manipulation of symbols to deliberately and systematically shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve the propagandists’ desired intent. Kuhn (1991) noted propaganda is effective because it exploits people’s reluctance to intellectually engage with any oppositional or alternative views. Simply put, people seek to have their prejudices confirmed by pseudo-evidence.

In a social or institutional setting, propaganda serves to spur allegiance and action to existing economic, political, sociological, or institutional norms, values and beliefs (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1992). Since it is based on a general climate or agreed-upon facts, sociological or institutional propaganda is often seen as simply reinforcing agreed-upon values (Black, 2001; Qualter, 1962). Quite often, it influences people imperceptibly, without the appearance of more obvious overt political propaganda.

The hoped-for by-product of sociological/institutional propaganda is institutional hegemony, the spontaneous adoption of “new criteria of judgment and choice . . . almost as if choosing them via free will” (Black, 2001, p. 125). This “long-term” propaganda becomes self-reproducing and reshapes the institutional or social field as a stable, permanent social setting (Black, 2001; Ellul, 1965). In addition to its long-term character, such propaganda is often unconsciously produced and integrated within institutions by institutional actors who are thoroughly and often blindly “. . . invested in the values and belief systems being promulgated” (Black, 2001, p. 126). These unintentional propagandists often merely view their mission as maintaining and reinforcing the status quo, crafting a mythological ideology, which possesses cultural and economic solidarity. Gramsci (1971) termed this a *historical bloc*, bound by religious, economic and other ideological ties. Within such a bloc, sociological propaganda allows institutional actors to successfully form alliances with other powerful stakeholders or institutions. To insure hegemony appeals to a wider range of groups, the propagandists must plausibly claim their particular interests are congruent with those of society at large, or at least of the institutional stakeholders to whom they are appealing for support.

**Historical Use of Propaganda by the NCAA**

As Black (2001) notes, all institutions—at some level—engage in the use of propaganda. The NCAA has long traded in the art and science of propaganda (Byers & Hammer, 1995; McCormick & McCormick, 2006; Sperber, 1990; Staurowsky & Sack, 2005). The control of messages about the college-sport enterprise through the
employment of propaganda techniques by the NCAA is particularly salient given its members are institutions of higher learning. While the corporate entity of college sport as embodied in the NCAA national office has benefited from the use of propaganda, NCAA members’ mission is presumed to be fostering independent thought and critical thinking among the citizenry so as to promote an important system of checks and balances to ensure power is used for the greater good rather than the self-serving interests of the few (Hofstadter, 1966; Sack & Staurowsky, 1998).

Despite this obvious disconnect, the college-sport enterprise has been built on a series of legal fictions spun from the imaginative and strategic manufacture of language designed to create the impression that the business practices associated with the running of big-time college sport are educational and not exploitative in nature (Huma & Staurowsky, 2011). The clearest example of this duplicity is evidenced in the history of the term, student-athlete. Fitting within a widely held common sense belief that the term captures the priority system that places value on students first and athletes second, the term has a far less obvious and far more serious history.

After establishing the 1-year athletic grant-in-aid (GIA), a decision that effectively set up a system of pay for play that threatened the NCAA’s fundamental principle of amateurism, college-sport leaders confronted the looming prospect that athletes would be identified as employees by state industrial commissions and the courts. “According to Walter Byers, the term student-athlete was created by the NCAA to convince workers’ compensation boards, as well as the general public, that scholarship athletes are students like any others” (Staurowsky & Sack, 2005, p. 105). Mobilizing a newly emerging staff of public relations professionals in athletic departments called Sports Information Directors (SIDs), Byers issued strict instructions that “student-athlete” was to be used whenever possible. In his memoir, he wrote,

We crafted the term “student-athlete”, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations as a mandated substitute for such words as players and athletes. We told college publicists to speak of “college teams”, not football or basketball “clubs”, a word common to the pros. (Byers & Hammer, 1995, p. 69)

This pattern of linguistic subterfuge has formed the foundation for a commercial institutional logic that drives the college-sport enterprise in general and the NCAA’s approach to business more specifically (Southall & Nagel, 2008; Southall et al., 2008; Southall, Southall, & Dwyer, 2009). The most recent iteration of this is the case under consideration here.

**Method**

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) acknowledges that language (discourse) derives its meaning from particular historical, social, and political contexts (Fiske, 1994). In addition discourse can be used to assert power and knowledge, and achieve hegemony, or to resist and critically analyze (Luke, 1997). As Fairclough (2000) noted, discourse is not only shaped and constrained by social/cultural structures (e.g., class, status, age,
ethnic identity, and gender), it also shapes and reflects an institution’s logics (e.g., identities, relationships, and systems of knowledge and beliefs; Southall & Nagel, 2008). In light of this duality, CDA unites, and determines the relationship between, three levels of analysis: (a) the actual text, (b) the discursive practices (e.g., creating, writing, speaking, reading, and hearing), and (c) the larger social or institutional context within which the text and the discursive practices occur (Fairclough, 2000).

Utilizing CDA as our theoretical and methodological guide, we retrace the creation, refinement, dissemination, and imbedding of the Collegiate Model of Athletics within the institutional field of NCAA Division-I college sport. This analysis offers an opportunity to examine the term as an example of sociological propaganda and hegemony within the U.S. college-sport institutional field. Using publicly available primary documents generated by NCAA staff members, most specifically state of the association addresses from 2003 through 2009 and 2010 NCAA president’s briefing documents, we follow the path of the Collegiate Model as its elements become taken-for-granted “facts,” which embody summarily agreed-upon values and norms within the institutional field of NCAA Division I college sport. This analysis is supplemented with research on key figures working within the NCAA during this time period, as well as relevant news accounts.

The NCAA Collegiate Model of Athletics

Setting the Stage: 2003 NCAA State of the Association Address

On his 2003 appointment as NCAA president, Myles Brand was the first former university president to serve as the Association’s highest-ranking official. However, as he made clear from the outset in his first state-of-the-association address, he had 15 years of experience dealing with college-sport issues, “Even though I have much to learn, my mind is not a blank slate” (Brand, 2003, p. 1). In his first address Brand articulated several “key principles that should underlie any adequate strategic plan for reform and advocacy in college sports” (Brand, 2003, p. 1). These four articulated principles included:

1. The conviction that intercollegiate athletics must be integrated into the academic mission of colleges and universities.
2. [P]residential control of intercollegiate athletics is essential.
3. [T]he positive value of intercollegiate athletics should be stressed and reinforced.
4. [T]he integrity of intercollegiate athletics is and must remain paramount. College sports have their own unique identity. They are different from professional sports. (Brand, 2003, pp. 3-4)

In addition to these principles, he identified one enduring value that made college athletics distinct from professional sports and “should be preserved and nurtured” (Brand, 2003, p. 4). This was the long-held belief that
These athletes are amateurs in the sense of the term most often understood by the general public. The sense of the game for its own value, the feeling of pride in the competition itself, the recognition for the local champions. (Brand, 2003, p. 4)

Brand also specifically referenced NCAA Bylaw 2.9: The Principle of Amateurism:

Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises. (NCAA, 2012, p. 4)

His allusion recalled the NCAA’s 1916 description (embodied in Article VI[b]) of a college athlete as “one who participates in competitive physical sports only for the pleasure, and the physical, mental, moral, and social benefits derived therefrom” (Sack & Staurowsky, 1998, pp. 34-35), as well as its 1922 definition of an NCAA athlete as “one who engages in sport solely for the physical, mental, or social benefits he derives therefrom, and to whom the sport is nothing more than an avocation” (Sack & Staurowsky, 1998, p. 35).

**Unveiling the Collegiate Model: 2004**

While there was no specific mention of the term in his 2003 speech, two principles (1 and 4) from that address provided the framework for his “timeless,” but not-yet-fully articulated, “Collegiate Model of Athletics.” Brand’s 2004 State of the Association address provided a national opportunity to unveil the model and articulate its enduring values to various constituencies. To provide an institutional context within which to place the Collegiate Model, the first portion of his 2004 speech addressed ways Brand felt the NCAA was often misunderstood and mischaracterized. Seeking to clear up such confusion, he outlined three entities that comprise the NCAA: the association or “body corporate,” the members, and the national office and staff (Brand, 2004, p. 2). These three NCAA components were more fully defined in the subsequent April 2004 NCAA Strategic Plan:

The “Association” is the “corporate entity” comprising member institutions, conferences, the governance structure (for example, boards, cabinets, committees) and affiliated entities (for example coaches associations), as well as student-athletes, coaches and athletics administrators.

The “membership” of the Association is primarily the colleges and universities. It is campus based.

The “national office” represents the employees in Indianapolis who make up the infrastructure of the Association. (NCAA Executive Committee, 2004, p. 2)
Brand also believed such confusion was deliberately created, “occasionally by the media, but sometimes by the membership itself” as a “handy cover for anything that appears to run counter to common sense or the interests of some person or group” (Brand, 2004, p. 2).

Having defined the NCAA, Brand highlighted the NCAA national office’s recent ongoing strategic-planning process as “a recommitment to the Collegiate Model of athletics . . . a value-based template for intercollegiate athletics. It is a vision for the future that must guide us” (Brand, 2004, p. 6). In addition, he reiterated the collegiate model’s historical primacy: “The Collegiate Model is more than a hundred years old. The professional approach is a more recent development” (Brand, 2004, p. 6).

Within this historical context, during the remainder of his speech Brand compared and contrasted the two “dominant approaches to sport in America—the Collegiate Model and the Professional Model” (Brand, 2004, p. 6). Utilizing the term collegiate model 21 times in 27 paragraphs, he noted that beyond youth and high-school sport these were the two central competing models and demarcated their critical difference: “Simply put, the Collegiate Model is education based, The Professional Model is profit based” (Brand, 2004, p. 6).

Having clearly demarcated each model’s primary goal, Brand proceeded to differentiate each model’s athletes: “[P]articipants in the Professional Model represent a labor force in pursuit of a negotiated salary . . . College teams consist of students enrolled in the academic programs of their universities” (Brand, 2004, p. 7). Warning “college sports must not be allowed to be drawn to the professional model like a moth drawn to a flame” (Brand, 2004, p. 7), Brand cautioned, “If this movement continues, college sports as we know it will disappear, and with it, the educational value to student-athletes and the institutional good will and support from alumni and fans” (Brand, 2004, p. 7). Ominously, Brand described this drift toward the professional model as a looming disaster: “The threat is real, and the consequences devastating. I want to go on record in calling attention to this potential disaster” (Brand, 2004, p. 7).

To avert this catastrophe, Brand charted three objectives that must be met to reaffirm the “Collegiate Model and sustain its future within higher education in ways that are valuable to universities” (Brand, 2004, p. 7):

First, we have to recommit to academic success as a primary goal of intercollegiate athletics. Second, we have to respect the concept that the student-athlete is central to the enterprise. And third, we have to reconnect athletics programmatically and financially with the rest of the university. (Brand, 2004, p. 7)

Failure to recommit to the Collegiate Model would continue the “cultural deterioration of the fundamental relationship between college sports and the college campus” (Brand, 2004, p. 7).

According to Brand the role of the Association is to be “central point of contact in sustaining the Collegiate Model” (Brand, 2004, p. 8). As the forum in which college-sport’s values are discussed and the platform “on which value-based rules of conduct are built” (Brand, 2004, p. 8), the Association must necessarily develop “successful
cooperative arrangements and agreements among those who have a legitimate stake in college sport” (Brand, 2004, p. 8). Forging such partnerships with college-sport’s stakeholders is “the means by which cooperative action is undertaken in support of the Collegiate Model” (Brand, 2004, p. 8).

Since it “is, and should be, the neutral, objective instrument for cooperative action” (Brand, 2004, p. 8), Brand pledged the national office would promote cooperative decision making and action among all identified stakeholders (Brand, 2004). In addition, since the Collegiate Model “represents our best future, and the role of the national office and the president of the Association is to articulate this vision and to take strong and consistent action in support of it” (Brand, 2004, p. 8), Brand promised to personally “advocate strongly for the Collegiate Model of athletics” (Brand, 2004, p. 8). Such advocacy would help sustain the Collegiate Model and insure “that we all are rowing in the same direction and at the same time” (Brand, 2004, p. 8).

Brand closed his address with a historically based, a priori affirmation of the Collegiate Model: “I am more convinced than ever that the relationship between intercollegiate athletics and higher education has survived the test of time because those who went before us had the values right” (Brand, 2004, p. 8). He also vowed to defend “the collegiate model against those who would turn intercollegiate athletics into professional sports” (Brand, 2004, p. 8), which throughout his presidency would be defined by the national office as “nearly by definition the primary focus of the office of the NCAA president” (NCAA, 2010c, para. 3). Finally, he called on the membership, the association and the national office to help him protect the Collegiate Model. “It falls to us—all of us—to see that these values are preserved and that they direct our future actions” (Brand, 2004, p. 8).

Obtaining Spontaneous Consent

Having publicly defined the Collegiate Model for the membership and Association, the national office developed and implemented a plan to consistently use the term with the steady drumbeat of what it means (NCAA, 2010c, para. 3) in all communications with various partners within the “body corporate.” “[T]hrough messaging with the use of various communication platforms” the national office sought to “continually reinforce the concept and steadily build the context for the relationship of intercollegiate athletics to higher education” (NCAA, 2010c, para. 3) within the governance structure and among affiliated entities such as the Faculty Athletics Representatives Association (FARA), Division I Athletics Directors Association, National Association of Academic Advisors for Athletics (N4A), Association of Governing Boards (AGB), and Coalition of Intercollegiate Athletics (COIA). As part of this plan, in January 2005, Brand formed a NCAA Presidential Task Force on the Future of Division I Intercollegiate Athletics. Eighteen months later, the task force published its report: The Second-Century Imperatives: Presidential Leadership—Institutional Accountability (Presidential Task Force, 2006).

In the report “collegiate model” appears 22 times and the first subsection “The Collegiate Model of Athletics” (NCAA, 2006, p. 8) reiterates Brand’s 2004 State of
the Association definition. The subsection’s final paragraph summarizes the unique nature of the “enterprise of intercollegiate athletics that has emerged—with its emphasis on the participants as student” (NCAA, 2006, p. 9). In addition, the final sentence outlines the model’s utilitarian goal, “to maximize the number of students who benefit from competition as part of their total educational experience” (NCAA, 2006, p. 9) and describes this goal as “jeopardized as the collegiate model drifts toward the professional approach” (NCAA, 2006, p. 9).

During its deliberations the NCAA presidential task force reached out to several affiliated organizations, including FARA and COIA for input. A draft of the task force’s report was forwarded to COIA in late 2005. As a result 28 COIA members from 24 [COIA] member senates met on December 2-3, 2005, at Washington State University to discuss the task force’s work (Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics [COIA], 2005; COIA, 2012). Participants drafted eight brief reports that included recommendations on specific task force topics: “fiscal responsibility, presidential leadership, over-commercialization, the nature of the collegiate model, integration of athletics into campus life, and admissions and diversity” (COIA, 2012, para. 6). An initial draft was endorsed by the meeting’s participants and a final document: A Report to the NCAA Presidential Task Force was approved by the COIA Steering Committee and submitted to the NCAA on December 23, 2005 (COIA, 2012).

According to Dr. Nathan Tublitz, at the time COIA Steering Committee co-chair, there was no discussion among meeting participants regarding the task force’s use of the term collegiate model, since COIA members “viewed the term ‘collegiate model’ as being synonymous with amateurism as I remember it from the 1960s” (personal communication, October 16, 2012). Consistent with this expansive view of amateurism, in its report COIA suggested the following as part of a concise statement of the collegiate model’s nature:

College sports can help develop the character of athletes, create a focus for campus community, and sustain ties between schools, alumni, and the public. These attributes shape the collegiate model of athletics, which is extra-curricular competition among students whose immediate goals must be educational. Unlike professional sports, in the collegiate model students who participate in athletics are not to receive financial rewards for participation beyond what the NCAA allows and their immediate goals should be related to educational objectives. (COIA, 2005, pp. 8-9)

In addition, COIA recommended the “NCAA and its member institutions should clarify and broadly publicize the distinction between collegiate and professional sports” (COIA, 2005, p. 9).

In concert with obtaining consent from associated organizations, Brand and the NCAA national office continued to espouse and reinforce the collegiate model. This process included columns, articles in academic journals, and speeches at symposia and conferences. In addition, there were nuanced refinements to the collegiate model. The model’s evolving character was articulated in Brand’s 2006 address.
Refining the Collegiate Model: 2006 State of the Association Address

The 2006 NCAA Convention marked the association’s centennial celebration (Brand, 2006). As is often the case on such a historic occasion, Brand utilized his 2006 State of the Association address to recount the story of the NCAA’s founding and remind the membership, association and national office staff that “sports, especially college sports, both shape and are shaped by American culture” (Brand, 2006, p. 2). In addition, he noted “we are the only country in the world that integrates sports with education at the secondary and collegiate levels” and “what began 100 years ago in the marriage of sports with college, is as American and as celebrated by Americans as apple pie and the Fourth of July” (Brand, 2006, p. 2).

While recognizing “[t]he NCAA, of course, does not have the luxury to redesign the enterprise from scratch” (Brand, 2006, p. 2), Brand called on the “body corporate” who have “inherit[ed] the history of college sports” [and who] “represent those who are engaged in it . . . to be singularly aware that college sports does not exist in a vacuum, a Platonic heaven, so to speak” (Brand, 2006, p. 2). As a result, he urged college coaches, administrators and athletes to “better understand what we have wrought” (Brand, 2006, p. 2), and—hearkening back to the NCAA’s founders and President Theodore Roosevelt—declared the NCAA “has a distinct obligation for normative leadership; leadership that is value-based . . . [I]t behooves us to get it right” (Brand, 2006, p. 2). To assist the body corporate in meeting this moral obligation, Brand next began to articulate an historic, but yet to be articulated, metaethical conceptual framework:

To be the voice and conscience of college sports, to be true to the intent of those in our universities who founded our organization and continue to provide leadership, and yet to be appropriately pragmatic, we need a conceptual framework for college sports that is aspirational, value-based, but realistic. And a Centennial is an appropriate milestone at which to reaffirm the underlying structure. I have been calling this framework ‘The Collegiate Model of Athletics’. (Brand, 2006, p. 2)

Brand felt that “[a]rmed with this framework, we can begin to look ahead to the future of intercollegiate athletics . . . and influence its directions” (Brand, 2006, p. 2).

Having previously (in his 2003 and 2004 State of the Association addresses and other commentaries) differentiated the collegiate model from other models, Brand proceeded to outline “three key principles that constitute the collegiate model, namely ones that pertain to the participants, the contests, and the enterprise as a whole” (Brand, 2006, p. 2). These principles included:

- Principle No. 1—Those who participate in intercollegiate athletics are to be students attending a university or college.
- Principle No. 2—Intercollegiate athletics contests are to be fair, conducted with integrity, and the safety and well-being of those who participate are paramount.
• Principle No. 3—Intercollegiate athletics is to be wholly embedded in universities and colleges.

Immediately after outlining these principles, Brand bestowed on them a deontological-based, a priori status of “axioms [that] should dictate the fundamental nature of college sports” (Brand, 2006, p. 2). While he next proceeded to examine each principle, the majority of his address focused on the first and third principles, which dealt with the participants and the college-athletics enterprise, respectively.

The participants. In Brand’s Collegiate Model “the heart of the matter . . . [is] those who participate are university and college students. It is a student-centered enterprise. Student-athletes come first” (Brand, 2006, p. 3). While conceding that “[a] few will play professional sports” Brand reiterated the NCAA’s public-relation messaging, “There are more than 360,000 student-athletes, and almost all of them will go pro in something other than sports” (Brand, 2006, p. 3). Everything rests on this principle, “[s]ince the participants in college sports are students—individuals whose first order of business is acquiring an education” (Brand, 2006, p. 3).

Building on this proposition, Brand went on to rebuke “critics of college sports [who] never tire of asking why we do not pay college athletes . . . at least those stars who attract thousands to the stadiums and millions to televised games” (Brand, 2006, p. 3). Offering an expanded restatement of his initial proposition, Brand noted,

The fundamental reason we do not pay student-athletes to play is because they are students. This commitment is captured in the first principle of the collegiate model. The participants in intercollegiate athletics are students. They are not, in their roles as athletes, employees of the university. They are students who participate in athletics as part of their educational experience. (Brand, 2006, p. 4)

However, this principle was not simply many people’s romanticized notion of amateurism, which Brand criticized as being rooted “in the class distinctions of 19th century England, where sport was reserved for those whose wealth permitted participation as a leisure activity” (Brand, 2006, p. 4). Nor was the collegiate model “a halcyon ideal that college sports can operate without commercial support and indifferent to the realities of a modern business model” (Brand, 2006, p. 4). Fundamentally, “the best way to articulate the collegiate model is to emphasize the initial principle, that those who participate in college sports are regular students. Anything else is professional sports” (Brand, 2006, p. 4).

The college athletics enterprise. Having defined the participants and briefly discussing the need for the NCAA to insure a level playing field and student-athlete well-being by “establishing and enforcing the rules” (Brand, 2006, p. 4), Brand spent the remainder of his address enunciating his third principle, which was also “the most fundamental principle of the collegiate model [upon which] everything else rests” (Brand, 2006, p. 5). This principle’s “central point is that intercollegiate athletics is embedded, is part
of, the university” (Brand, 2006, p. 5). As a result, Brand proclaimed the same inher-
ited “values that underlie the modern American university and college ought to under-
lie their athletics programs” (Brand, 2006, p. 5).

Recognizing our universities are proud of being meritocracies, he then lamented the
“intolerable lack of head coaches who are African American in Divisions I, II, and III,
including the high-profile Division I-A level” (Brand, 2006, p. 5), and declared that
“as we identify specific barriers to success for women and people of color to leader-
ship positions, we will take appropriate steps to correct the problem” (Brand, 2006,
p. 6). He also noted that college presidents again “become more involved in the direc-
tions of the NCAA” (Brand, 2006, p. 6).

After touching on these issues—and announcing the formation of two task forces,
as well as legislative changes designed to continue reform efforts—Brand returned to
“one final major issue that pertains to the third principle of the college model, namely,
the underlying financial structure of intercollegiate athletics” (Brand, 2006, p. 6). Just
as he had in his 2004 address, in which he addressed confusion regarding the NCAA
itself, Brand proceeded to clear up significant misunderstanding of the financial model
for athletics that supports collegiate athletics, which “despite differences among the
divisions in grant-in-aids, fan bases and expenditure levels . . . is basically the same as
the university as a whole” (Brand, 2006, p. 6). In this model, “universities attempt to
maximize their revenues and redistribute those funds according to their educational
mission” (Brand, 2006, p. 7).

Brand noted, “There is nothing wrong with this financial approach; indeed without
it, the modern comprehensive university, as we know it, could not exist” (Brand, 2006,
p. 7). Since an athletic department is part of a university, it should also maximize rev-
enue and redistribute it to meet its strategic emphasis (Brand, 2006). Because in an
NCAA D-I athletic department

the revenue sports—most often only football and men’s basketball—generate resources that
are needed to conduct all the other sports in the program . . . it has an obligation to conduct
its revenue-generating activities in a productive and sound business-like manner. (Brand,
2006, p. 7)

As Brand explained, revenue maximization on the “in-put” side allows an athletic
department to follow its nonprofit mission on expenditure or “out-put” side, and maxi-
mize participation opportunities for its athletes (Brand, 2006). As a result, “the busi-
ness of college sports is not a necessary evil; rather it is a proper part of the overall
enterprise” (Brand, 2006, p. 8). However Brand cautioned, “We must not let the inter-
est in the ‘business’ of college sports become so alluring or enticing that it diverts us
from the primary purpose of intercollegiate athletics—providing athletics opportuni-
ties for students that enhance their academic experience” (Brand, 2006, p. 8). Consequent-
ly, increased commercialism, including the NCAA national office negoti-
ating and managing broadcast media contracts is “an obligation, derived from its
members to maximize the revenue from these contracts and to manage them following
the best business practices” (Brand, 2006, p. 8).
Rejecting the outdated idea that “working too hard to generate revenue somehow taints the purity of college sports” (Brand, 2006, p. 8), Brand declared it was not improper for the NCAA to be engaged in such business activities and exhorted all NCAA members involved in the enterprise to “not be ambivalent about doing the business of college sports” (Brand, 2006, p. 8). As long as such business activity “is informed by the values of higher education . . . We should do it well” (Brand, 2006, p. 8). Most importantly, the collegiate model provided a pragmatic framework to address critics who contended college sports’ increased commercialism was incompatible with amateurism. Brand dismissed such a view as ‘nonsense! [and] a misinterpretation and a misapplication of amateurism, [since] ‘Amateur’ defines the participants, not the enterprise” (Brand, 2006, p. 8).

In closing, Brand challenged the association, its members and the national office staff to embrace the unknown future of college sports and its challenges. “What we do now and how we react to changing events and conditions determines what the future will be for intercollegiate athletics” (Brand, 2006, p. 9). He repeatedly referred to this historic obligation as “an awesome and grand trust [that] carries the obligation to act on the basis of our values” (Brand, 2006, p. 9).

**Imbedding the Collegiate Model: 2009 State of the Association Address**

While not ignoring the collegiate model, Brand’s 2007 and 2008 addresses spent relatively little time discussing the collegiate model. However, in his 2007 address Brand did briefly discuss Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) Division I athletic departments’ spending behaviors. Specific to coaches’ compensation, which continued to be a national topic of discussion, Brand noted,

> The institutions with revenues exceeding expenses have clearly responded to a changed compensation market. Frankly, it can be argued the increases in both gross and net revenues attributed to the success of a new coaching regime is a sound investment. (Brand, 2007, p. 4)

However, he noted that not all programs had experienced this positive return on investment. For these “have not” programs, “Spending more has not meant sufficiently more revenue to reduce subsidies” (Brand, 2007, p. 4).

In his 2007 address Brand had also described his encouragement at “the rising presence of the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics, which now includes the faculty senates on more than 50 division I campuses. COIA is poised to stand with the [FARA] as significant allies for presidents in addressing fiscal issues” (Brand, 2007, p. 4).

In 2009, on the eve of the NCAA convention, Dr. Brand was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. Consequently, Wallace I. Renfro (NCAA vice-president and senior advisor) delivered Brand’s 2009 address. In what would be his last address, Brand discussed “the Challenges of Commercial Activity [and] . . . the relationship of commercialism to sports” (Brand, 2009, p. 1). Beginning with the premise that “college sports occupies a central place in the American culture” (Brand, 2009, p. 1), Brand focused on an “exasperating challenge for intercollegiate athletics: the proper role for
commercial activity” and finding “a proper balance that helps financially support as many participation opportunities as possible without swamping the principle of amateurism” (Brand, 2009, p. 2). Framing this issue’s importance, he declared, “If this issue has not already reached crisis, it is certainly approaching it” (Brand, 2009, p. 2).

Conceding that in recent years college sports’ revenues have not kept pace with expenditures, Brand outlined three potential categories from which new funds could come to meet increased expenditures: (a) increased donor contributions, (b) increased subsidy from the university general fund, and (c) increased commercial activity (Brand, 2009). He then proceeded to declare: “Increased fundraising, while important, may not be the best solution. Almost every campus subsidizes athletics, and there is nothing wrong with subsidization, [but] . . . continued large increases in subsidy for athletics is proving problematic” (Brand, 2009, p. 2). As a result, “That, then, leaves increases in commercial activity to fund increased expenses in athletics” (Brand, 2009, p. 2).

Within this climate, Brand pointed out the “new media environment” provides “opportunities for universities to generate revenue by selling the rights to present and distribute their sporting events to those new media outlets” (Brand, 2009, p. 3). However, this highly competitive “confluence of the Internet and reality animation makes difficult control by content providers—namely us” (Brand, 2009, p. 3). This results in “increased commercialism and why, at this time, the challenge to finding the right balance for is [sic] critical” (Brand, 2009, p. 3). Seeking this balance, Brand pointed out, required “some level of commercial activity—from nominal levels of local sponsorship to huge media and corporate contracts, [since] . . . [w]ithout commercial activity, intercollegiate athletics as we know it could not exist. This is true even in the Divisions II and III” (Brand, 2009, p. 4). Pragmatically, while these divisions might have much less overt commercialism, “the ability of Divisions II and III to conduct championships are based—indirectly at least—in commercial activity . . . by revenues generated from the Division I men’s basketball tournament” (Brand, 2009, p. 4).

However, Brand quickly pointed out, crass commercialism and unrealistic idealism were mistaken extremes. In addition he declared that “even if it generates substantial revenues for athletics . . . student-athletes should not be commercially exploited” (Brand, 2009, p. 4). Since college athletes are students, not professionals, “exploiting student-athletes for commercial purposes is as contrary to the collegiate model as paying them” (Brand, 2009, p. 5). In addition, “there must be shared responsibility in the oversight of commercial activity” (Brand, 2009, p. 5) among the NCAA national office, conferences, and individual universities. The national office has the responsibility “for conducting and managing the media rights for championship events (except BCS football)” (Brand, 2009, p. 5), while conferences “negotiate media and corporate contracts on behalf of and at the direction of their conference members” (Brand, 2009, p. 5). Universities—as NCAA members—have the responsibility of overseeing “their athletic programs and events in which their teams compete, so the [collegiate model’s] core principles are followed” (Brand, 2009, p. 5).
Such shared-responsibility grew out of the understanding that while “some level of commercial activity is necessary even appropriate . . . also understand that there must be a balance reached so that such activity does not overwhelm the values of higher education” (Brand, 2009, p. 5). Any discussion of balancing commercial activity involves asking the question, “What is not acceptable under any circumstance?” (Brand, 2009, p. 5). To answer this question, Brand said, “We need first to distinguish between two types of commercial activity . . . commercialism that directly involves student-athletes and commercialism that does not” (Brand, 2009, p. 5). Referring to the Collegiate Model’s first axiom (Brand, 2004), he outlined the Condition of Nonexploitation, “Since student-athletes are amateurs, not paid professionals, they cannot accept payment for endorsing or advertising any commercial product or service” (Brand, 2009, p. 6). According to Brand, this principle is not subject to debate: “commercial exploitation of student-athletes is not permissible. Period. This is the clearest and most important line of demarcation between college and professional sports” (Brand, 2009, p. 6).

However, “[u]sing pictures of student-athletes by programs to promote the upcoming big game or to promote literacy . . . is acceptable” (Brand, 2009, p. 6). In addition, other types of commercial activities not directly involving college athletes were also acceptable, including licensed merchandise and clothing, coaches endorsing commercial products or services, advertising signage, commercial sponsorships (e.g., shoes or soft drink; Brand, 2009). In addition, while shared responsibility was important, Brand conceded that while commercial activity involving college athletes must have “enforceable rules and meaningful sanctions . . . these rules are not easy to formulate correctly” (Brand, 2009, p. 7). In addition, “there need not be consistency at the national, conference, and institutional levels in commercial activity” (Brand, 2009, p. 7) that does not directly involved college athletes.

As a matter of fact, to require such consistency in oversight for commercial activity is to try to legislate taste, and to do that is at best foolish. . . . Rules governing commercialism not directly involving student-athletes, therefore, are to be kept to a minimum. (Brand, 2009, p. 7)

Brand also placed the need for revenue generation within the Collegiate Model framework. “It is understood that commercial activity is undertaken to generate revenue. . . . Good judgment and sound contract negotiations with the media and corporate sponsors is the key to revenue generation” (Brand, 2009, p. 8). However, those involved in intercollegiate athletics must focus on college sports’ higher-education aspects and not emulate professional sports’ entertainment focus (Brand, 2009). Such a focus, in conjunction with good judgment by sensible people will continue to result in “widespread agreement with the condition of nonexploitation of student-athletes” (Brand, 2009, p. 9). In addition, when necessary the national office should provide “experienced, objective, and careful judgment . . . in interpreting rules pertaining to student-athlete exploitation” (Brand, 2009, p. 9).

As he had in 2006, Brand concluded his 2009 address by referring to Aristotle’s golden mean and intercollegiate athletics’ inherent moral goodness. “The objective,
then, is to determine the balancing point, all factors considered, between crass commercialism and unrealistic idealism” (Brand, 2009, p. 9). “Given the educational value of participation in athletics, it is important to not sell this great enterprise short. But it is immoral to sell it out. We must do it right” (Brand, 2009, p. 10), thereby protecting the Collegiate Model.

Conclusion and Implications

After more than five decades, through sophisticated and subtle sociological propaganda, the NCAA national office has achieved spontaneous consent to its collegiate model. This consent has involved almost unanimous approval and support by some (i.e., coaches, conference commissioners, and administrators, corporate partners), and “moral and political passivity” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 333) by others (i.e., presidents, FAR’s, and athletes) to the ever-increasing commercial forces and corporate partnerships that place primary importance on big-time football and men’s basketball as valued entertainment commodities. This ascendancy, which justifies free-market business decisions and practices, is neither accidental nor happenstance. Framing revenue maximization as an obligation (Brand, 2006), the model reflects big-time college-sport’s dominant commercial institutional logic (Southall & Nagel, 2008). Not surprisingly, the NCAA national office has declared, “the business of college sports is not a necessary evil, [but] a proper part of the overall enterprise” (Brand, 2006, p. 8). As a result creating, refining, imbedding and protecting its model has become “nearly by definition the primary focus of the office of the NCAA president” (NCAA, 2010c, para. 4).

During the critical time period between 1951 and 1988, when the “promotional power of television became the most important factor in the tremendous growth” (Dunnavant, 2004) of college football, and college basketball began to morph into March Madness®, the architect of agreements struck by the NCAA was its executive director, Walter Byers. His understanding of media, born out of a career in journalism, served as the impetus that “. . . made a kingdom out of what once was a dot on the American sports scene” (McCallum, 1986, para. 7). According to Jack McCallum (1986), a writer for Sports Illustrated, Byers cultivated a corporate culture wherein NCAA staff learned the art form of “following the party line” while college presidents had largely ceded authority to the NCAA. Notably, it is at the moment when Byers started to advocate for an “open” division in college athletics, “. . . an idea that meant a dismantling of the present concept of amateurism to accommodate the big-money climate of the 80s . . .” that he retired.

This juncture is significant because the “party line” camouflaged the college-sport enterprise’s monopoly practices that exploit revenue-producing athletes’ labor, while simultaneously excluding them from participating in the burgeoning market economy (Byers & Hammer, 1995). As the enterprise’s architect stepped down, the NCAA national office and its partners continued consolidating their power, carrying on Byers’ legacy and engaging in their own acts of subterfuge. Saliently, as he prepared to retire, it was Byers who engaged in truth-telling regarding the business of college sport, as evidenced in a 1986 Sports Illustrated interview in which he advocated for plainly
acknowledging the NCAA had abandoned an amateur ideal (McCallum, 1986). His 1995 memoir, which serves as a decoder of the institutional logic that obfuscated the NCAA’s suspect practices, was dismissed by college-sport insiders (many of whom were deeply involved in the college-sport enterprise) as the ranting of a discontented contrarian whose time had passed (Echelin, 2012). For some scholars, however, the book resonated with an accuracy that was difficult to dismiss (McCormick & McCormick, 2006; Sack & Staurowsky, 1998; Staurowsky & Sack, 2005).

In a speech delivered by Byers to the Kansas City Sports Commission in 1994, he observed “The management of intercollegiate athletics stays in place committed to an outmoded code of amateurism drawn, quite frankly, with many of the same words that they had drawn in 1956” (Echelin, para. 6). The NCAA national office, including long-time staffers such as Renfro,7 continued the propaganda utilizing presidential figureheads Significantly, this is seen in the rise of Myles Brand as head of the organization in 2003 where the job title for the NCAA’s highest office was no longer that of “executive director” but “president,” an intentional attempt to shift focus from the corporate nature of the NCAA to that of higher education (Albion College, 2012).8 It is during Brand’s era that the NCAA, a sport governing body, is specifically described as a “higher education association.”9

Consistent with Black’s (2001) analysis, the national office’s propaganda has imperceptibly influenced marginalized NCAA institutional actors to adopt a mental and emotional state that fluctuates between resistance and conformity, disagreement and apathy. In addition, by positioning the NCAA president as a philosopher king,10 who speaks with almost unquestioned moral authority, the national office maintains a semblance of order, continuity and stability within college sport.

Dr. Brand’s cautionary appeal to the NCAA membership to avoid being drawn like moths to the professional model flame (i.e., “paying” college athletes any more than an athletic GIA) and reaffirm their commitment to the Collegiate Model is predicated on the axiom that paying athletes would unhinge college sport’s ties to alumni and fans, and result in the college-sport enterprise’s destruction. Few noted at the time this assertion was not supported by empirical evidence given that no publicly available research had been conducted to determine if such payment would be so objectionable to college-sport consumers that they would cease attending games. Furthermore, the timing of Brand’s collegiate-model pentalogy is notable given the NCAA was engaged in ongoing conversations with a primary media partner (ESPN) exploring a new venture that would deliver college-sport content to viewers 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. In September of 2004, ESPNU executive John Wildhack said ESPNU would give “...college-sports fans more of what they want. There is not a better opportunity for ESPN than this network, considering the roots of our company that go back to college basketball and football and our relationship with the NCAA” (Reynolds, 2004). This additional distribution channel was launched during the height of March Madness 2005. Ironically, one of ESPNU’s first broadcasts—under the umbrella of ESPN’s Emmy-award winning enterprise journalism franchise—Outside the Lines—was the “ESPNU Town Hall: Should College Athletes Be Paid?” Paradoxically, the NCAA’s hegemony was so complete it could even generate revenue off discussions about the issues plaguing college sports resulting from its collaboration with media partners.
While systematic and sustained propaganda need not be detrimental to society, its use to silence the masses is problematic, especially when applied in educational settings. Cautioning propaganda had the potential to discourage open-mindedness, a condition antithetical to education, Martin (1929) wrote, “Education aims at independence of judgment. Propaganda offers ready-made opinions for the unthinking herd” (as quoted in Black, 2001, p. 122). Herman and Chomsky (2002) likened the use of propaganda in a democracy to that of violence in a dictatorship, where mechanisms for dissent are effectively stifled either through benign messaging or outright force.

The NCAA national office’s efforts to insure consent to “. . . a better understood definition of amateurism that isolates the principle to the way in which student-athletes are viewed without imposing its avocational nature on revenue-producing opportunities” (NCAA, 2010a, para. 3) through consistent messaging and subtle persuasion rather than member engagement reveals the extent to which an effective sociological propaganda campaign can shape public discourse. This strategy is consistent with the NCAA’s federated governance structure, which isolates decision making among a small group of major conferences, and results in acquiescence from the vast majority of the NCAA “association” and “membership” (Staurowsky, 2004). While State of the Association addresses serve as blueprints for where the NCAA is headed, the vast majority of individuals working in college sport rarely read them, and only a few institutional decision makers actually hear the addresses. The subtle nuances in language and preferred terminology encoded in these speeches have been represented and retransmitted through NCAA communiqués that invite agreement rather than critical consideration. As a consequence, just as was the case with COIA, a group approached by Myles Brand to spontaneously support a Collegiate Model of which they had little, if any, working knowledge, some within the intercollegiate athletic community genuinely do not apprehend what is at stake in embracing a model that codifies the monetization and revenue maximization of the college-sport enterprise at every level, something once reserved only for Division I.

As a result, today’s college-sport landscape is populated with some who fail to comprehend the institutional hegemony, others who unquestionably view their mission as maintaining and reinforcing a status quo that conforms to taken-for-granted institutional facts, and a dominant group that actively creates and wields the Collegiate Model as a linguistic and philosophical “armor of coercion” (Adamson, 1980) to deliberately form, control, and alter the attitudes of those within the institutional field of college sport.

Within this discursive setting, college athletes’ choices are limited (Huma & Staurowsky, 2011). Not only do they often find it difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize an alternative college-sport logic, but since the collegiate model marks the boundaries of any discourse, a discourse college athletes inherit but effectively play no role in shaping, it is necessarily difficult or sometimes impossible for college athletes to determine the source of their alienation within the collegiate model, let alone conceptualize ways to remedy their situation. In addition, for marginalized college athletes, who—most notably—in NCAA Division-I have “no voice and no vote” the threat of officially sanctioned force (in the form of a loss in eligibility) remains an implicit control mechanism. As a result, college athletes—especially those
revenue-sport athletes who migrate to Predominately White Institutions (PWI) from geographically and culturally distant settings (Hawkins, 2010; Hawkins & Southall, 2012)—adopt a mental and emotional state that fluctuates between resistance and conformity, disagreement and apathy.

Nowhere is the NCAA national office’s overriding imposition of its authority and jurisdiction over subordinates (specifically athletes), more clearly evidenced than in its manipulation of “consent” through the use of “eligibility” documents (i.e., Form 12-3a—Student-Athlete Statement—NCAA Division I) to obtain access to athletes’ names and likeness. A pending lawsuit (O’Bannon v. NCAA)—and subsequent discovery and depositions—may serve to unmask the NCAA’s faux commitment to amateurism. The NCAA has manufactured consent to the economic interests of its Collegiate Model of Athletics through simultaneously threatening athletes with loss of eligibility and fostering uniform agreement among member institutions and representative leadership who consent to these practices with little opposition (Hinnen, 2013; Singer, 2013).

Achieving spontaneous consent among NCAA members allows for the proliferation of the NCAA National Office’s profit-seeking tendencies to move forward with little actual resistance. In concert with the national office, the NCAA’s most powerful football playing institutions have carved out a new playoff system under the name of the College Football Playoff that is expected to yield a $500 million return on four end of season games leading to a “national” champion (Schroeder, 2012). The NCAA national office, in turn, realizes nearly $800 million per year as a result of its multibillion dollar contract promoting March Madness and men’s basketball (Clarke, 2013). The NCAA national office’s very existence relies on the spontaneous consent it obtains from member institutions, athletes and other college-sport stakeholders for its Collegiate Model of Athletics.

This manuscript has focused on the creation and evolution of the “The Collegiate Model of Athletics” during Myles Brand’s presidency. Throughout this time-period, the NCAA national office consistently and staunchly dismissed any discussion of college-sport inconsistent with its Collegiate Model as simply unpleasant “cynicism” (Brand, 2008), while proclaiming college sport “. . . one of the great subcultures in America” (Brand, 2008, para. 7). While this may be true, future research should investigate whether, and to what extent, the current NCAA national-office administration, to protect its Collegiate Model, has engaged in an “aggressive public and media relations agenda [based upon the] consistent use of the term—with the steady drumbeat of what it means” (NCAA, 2010c, para. 3–4) to form, control, or alter the attitudes of actors within the institutional field of NCAA college sport.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. The former president at Indiana University was best known for firing Bob Knight, Indiana’s iconic men’s basketball coach.
2. Southall and Nagel (2009) have referred to the big-time college-sport enterprise’s adherence to market principles as *Jock Capitalism*.
3. In the construction of a theory, axioms are taken to be true without proof, stipulated to be an unproved premise for the proof of other inside a formal system. As Glock (1996) noted, “Axioms work for math like the rules of a game work for said game; they are the base, the entire support system that allows it to function” (p. 193). In contrast to Brand’s axiomatic schema, Davidson (1996) quotes Quine as saying truth “. . . is felt to harbor something of the sublime. Its pursuit is a noble pursuit, and unending...Science is seen as pursuing and discovering truth rather than as decreeing it” (p. 272).
4. An alternative reading of this arrangement, as Staurowsky (2004) pointed out, is that the NCAA has been successful in creating a corporate veil under the guise of amateurism that discourages accountability because no one entity is ever responsible for actions taken.
5. As of the writing of this manuscript a review of literature reveals no publicly available studies confirming this assertion.
6. At the 2005 *The Drake Group Conference*, Diane Dickman (Managing Director—NCAA Academic Membership Affairs) noted that in the NCAA’s initial calculation of NCAA athletes for this slogan (i.e., 360,000), FBS football and D-I men’s basketball players were not included.
7. With more than 40 years of media-relations experience and as (at the time of this writing) vice-president for public policy, Renfro has been credited with writing hundreds of speeches and position papers for NCAA officials (Washington and Lee, 2009).
8. Cedric Dempsey, a former NCAA Division I athletics director who had competed and coached at Division III Albion College, was the executive director at the time the NCAA transitioned from offices in Kansas City, Missouri, to Indianapolis, Indiana. He is the person responsible for recommending the change in job title for the Association’s chief officer, switching from “executive director” to “president” (“NCAA dedicates...,” 2012). Dempsey was responsible for overseeing the process that led to the NCAA’s current federated structure.
9. In his reminiscence following the death of Myles Brand in 2009, Stephen Jordan, president of Metropolitan State College and then chair of the NCAA Division II Presidents Council, wrote, “Myles Brand always reminded us that we in the NCAA are a higher education association” (NCAA President Myles Brand, A Legacy of Leadership, 2009).
10. In *The Republic*, Plato ascribes moral authority to philosopher kings, rulers who (as philosophers) possess knowledge of, and access to, *Forms*—archetypal entities that exist behind any particular instance of a form (e.g., Love itself as opposed to a particular instance of a person in love). Brand identified himself as a philosopher by training and preference. As a leader, he was referred to at times in the press as a “philosopher king” (Madigan, 2003).
11. According to the NCAA’s *Student-Athlete Advisor Committee* brochure, “The Division I national SAAC consists of one student-athlete from each of the 31 Division I conferences.
Members are selected by the current Division I SAAC members from a pool of three nominees from each of the represented conferences . . .” One SAAC member serves in an advisory role to the NCAA Division I Leadership Council (NCAA Academic and Membership Affairs Staff, 2012).

References


**Author Biographies**

**Richard M. Southall** is an associate professor in the Department of Sport and Entertainment Management, and director of the College Sport Research Institute at the University of South Carolina. He is internationally recognized as an expert on the NCAA Division-I profit sports of FBS football and men’s basketball. He is lead author on CSRI’s annual *NCAA Division-I Adjusted Graduation Gap Reports* for football, men’s and women’s basketball, softball, and baseball.

**Ellen J. Staurowsky** is a full professor in the Department of Sport Management at Drexel University. She is internationally recognized as an expert on social justice issues in sport, which include college athletes’ rights, gender equity and Title IX, pay equity and equal employment opportunity, the faculty role in reforming college sport, representation of women in sport media, and the misappropriation of American Indian imagery in sport. She is coauthor of the book *College Athletes for Hire: The Evolution and Legacy of the NCAA Amateur Myth* and is currently editing a book titled *Women and Sport: From Liberation to Celebration*. 